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COMMENT

IT'S TEN O'CLOCK: DO YOU KNOW WHERE
YOUR CHILDREN ARE? QUTB V STRAUSS AND
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE

CURFEWS
INTRODUCTION

"America is facing a ticking youth crime bomb."' Juvenile crime and
violence has increased sharply over the last decade,2 despite some reports

' Professor John Dilulio, Speech at Princeton University and at a Brookings Institute
Forum-Why the GOP is Right to Oppose the Crime Bill and Where to Go From Here, in 140
CONG. REC. H7943-44 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1994). In his speech, Professor Dilulio argued that
Congress should reject the 1994 Crime Bill because, among other things, the bill failed to
"address the problem of juvenile crime in a serious way." Id. at H7944. In addition, Professor
Dilulio noted that "It]he rate of growth in serious youth crime among white teenagers now
exceeds the rate of growth in serious youth crimes among black and Hispanic teenagers." Id.
2 Statistics reveal thatjuveniles are substantially contributing to the escalation of violent crime
in the United States. See Howard N. Snyder, Fact Sheet No. 16, Are Juveniles Driving the
Violent Crime Trends? (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preventiori, U.S. Dep't of
Justice), May 1994 [hereinafter Driving Trends]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reporting Program ("U.C.R. Program") provides statistics regarding crime and arrests
in the United States. Id. Four offenses-murder, rape, aggravated assault and robbery-are
grouped together and identified as the Violent Crime Index. Id. This index has been called the
"barometer of violent crime in the U.S." Id.; see also Barry Krisberg, Youth Crime and Its
Prevention: A Research Agenda, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 2-3 (Ira M.
Schwartz ed., 1992) (detailing F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports). The U.C.R. Program indicates
a 19% increase in violent crimes perpetrated by juveniles in the United States between 1983 and
1992. Driving Trends, supra. In 1992, there were an estimated 198 Violent Crime Index arrests
ofjuveniles for every 100,000 youths in the United States; the highest level ofjuvenile criminal
activity in 20 years. Howard Snyder, Fact Sheet No. 14, Juvenile Violent Crime Arrest Rates
1972-1992 (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice), May
1994 [hereinafter Juvenile Crime Rates] (citing 1992 FBI Uniform Crime Reports). From 1988
to 1992, the juvenile Violent Crime Index increased by 38 %.Id. Juveniles were involved in 15 %
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and contentions to the contrary.3 Moreover, not only are juveniles

frequently the perpetrators of violent crimes, but they also account for an
increasing number of the victims of such crimes.4 In 1992, one out of

of all murder arrests, Howard N. Snyder, Fact Sheet No. 13, 1992 Juvenile Arrests (Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice), May 1994, at 1 [hereinafter
1992 Juvenile Arrests], and were solely responsible for 9% of murders. Howard Snyder. Fact
Sheet No. 15, Violent Crimes Cleared by Juvenile Arrest (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice), May 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Violent Crimes
Cleared]. Moreover, between 1988 and 1992, the number of juvenile murder arrests grew by
51%. 1992 Juvenile Arrests, supra. By 1992, the proportion of murders committed by juveniles
was the highest in a generation. See Violent Crimes Cleared, supra.
Despite these developments, there has been a decrease in the number ofjuveniles committing
violent crimes. The number of juveniles arrested for murder, for example, decreased-from 5.4
arrests per 100,000 in 1991 to 5.0 arrests in 1992-for the first time in seven years. Juvenile
Crime Rates, supra. It would be too speculative, however, to attempt to determine whether this
is the beginning of a new trend. Moreover, the slight decrease in murder rates between 1991 and
1992 does not correspond with the rates of other violent crimes that make up the Violent Crime
Index. For example, there has been a substantial increase in the number of juveniles arrested for
aggravated assault. See Juvenile CrimeRates, supra, at 2. Between 1987 and 1992, the juvenile
arrest rate for this crime increased by 54% and, in 1992, for every 100,000 juveniles, the police
made 113 juvenile arrests for aggravated assault. Id. Robbery arrests also grew by a rate of 42%
between 1989 and 1991. Id. While the 1992 figures reveal a drop of 3% in the arrest rates of
juveniles for robbery, Dr. Snyder warns that it is too early to conclude that the drop is the start
of a new trend. Id. Overall, 16% of all violent crimes solved by police in 1992 resulted in the
arrest of a juvenile. 1992 Juvenile Arrests, supra.
I See Laura Sessions Stepp, The Crackdown on Juvenile Crime: Do Stricter Laws Deter
Youths?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al. Stepp cites an Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention report indicating that juvenile murder arrests decreased by 0.4% in 1992
as proof of a slow-down in juvenile violence. Id.; see Juvenile Crime Rates, supra note 2.
Additionally, Stepp contends that adult arrests increased by 15% between 1982 and 1992,
compared with a 5% increase in juvenile arrests for the same period. Stepp, supra, at Al. But
see 1992 Juvenile Arrests, supra note 2 (indicating that between 1989 and 1992, juvenile arrests
for crimes of Violent Crime Index increased by 47% while adult violent crimes increased by
19 %). Stepp's article does not address the argument that the increased percentage of adult crimes
is merely the result of the aging of former juvenile offenders. See Dilulio, supra note 1, at H7944
("Today's high-rate juvenile offenders are tomorrow's adult prisoners, but today's adult criminal
records don't comprehend yesteryear's slew of juvenile crimes.").
4 See In U.S., Crime Strikes Youth at High Rate, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1994, at A16; Joe
Sexton, Young Criminals' Prey: Usually Young, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994. at Al. Fifty-five
percent of all crimes against persons 12 to 19 years old were committed by members of the same
age group. Id. (citing Justice Department's 1992 statistics). In 1992, 1240 African-American and
1103 white juveniles were murdered nationwide. Id. at B14. According to statistics provided by
the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, in 1992,
one quarter of all victims of assaults, robberies and rapes were juveniles, even though juveniles
account for only 10% of the United States population. Joseph Moone, Fact Sheet No. 17,
Juvenile Victimization: 1987- 1992 (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S.
Dep't of Justice), June 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Juvenile Victimization]. In 1992, juveniles between
the ages of 12 and 17 were victims of 1.55 million violent crimes; one out of every 13 juveniles
was a victim of violent crime, a 23.4% increase from 1987. Id. Over the same period, the total
juvenile population grew less than 1%, indicating a significant increase in the rate of juvenile
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every seventy-two persons age thirty-five and over was a victim of a
violent crime, but one out of thirteen juveniles was a victim of murder,
rape, aggravated assault, or robbery.' The Justice Department's Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention recently issued a report6
calling for "an unprecedented national commitment of public and private
resources, energy and commitment to reducing juvenile violence and
juvenile victimization in our nation." 7 Additionally, the 103rd Congress

attempted to defuse this "ticking bomb" through the 1994 Violent Crime
Control Act 8 and other legislation.9 A number of social commentators

victimization. Of the violent personal crimes committed against American juveniles, approximately 1.3 million were assaults and over 200,000 were robberies. Id.
5 Juvenile Victimization, supra note 4, at 1.
6 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

(1994)
[hereinafter OJJDP REPORT].
I See John J. Wilson, OJJDPDevelops Strategy to Reduce Juvenile Violence, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, Aug. 1994, at 118. The OJJDP strategy consists of two elements: the preventive
component and the intervention component. Id. The former adopts a community-based approach
towards juvenile crime; communities are "to systematically assess their delinquency problem in
relation to known risk factors and to set up programs to counteract them." Id. The latter
component combines the accountability and punishments faced by the juvenile offender with a
variety of intense treatment and rehabilitationoprograms. Id.
8 Violent Crime Prevention and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322.
§ 30701, 108 Stat. 1796, 1855 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (Supp. 1994)) [hereinafter
Violent Crime Act]. The Act makes grants available to non-profit organizations seeking to
develop and organize programs to benefit juvenile delinquents or youths deemed to be "at-risk"
of becoming delinquents. Id. § 30701(a)(1)(C). The federal government has set aside $36 million
to be distributed over the next five years to such organizations. Id. § 30702.
The Violent Crime Act also provides substantial appropriations to other juvenile crime
prevention programs. See id. §§ 31501-31504 (amending Urban Park and Recreation Recovery
Act of 1978, §§ 1003, 1004, 1005, 1007(b). 1013 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2502, 2503, 2504,
2506(b), 2512)). For example, the Violent Crime Act provides $3.5 million to individual states
"to improve recreation facilities and expand recreation services in urban areas with a high
incidence of crime and to help deter crime through the expansion of recreation opportunities for
at-risk youths." Violent Crime Act § 31501. More significantly, the Violent Crime Act also
provides funding to qualifying cities that establish "[m]idnight sports league programs" in
conjunction with employment and educational training. Id. § 30201(a)(2)(E). These provisions
of the Violent Crime Act, however, have been met with virulent opposition. See, e.g., Dilulio,
supra note 1; Glen Kessler, Something for All: In Trying For Mass Appeal, Bill is Open to
Criticism,NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 1994. it A7; It Oughta Be a Crime: Omnibus CrimeBill of 1994,
NAT. REV., Sept. 12, 1994, at 14 [hereinafter It Oughta Be A Crime]. Critics of the Violent
Crime Act wanted to purge the legislation of these programs because they represented "wasteful
social spending or congressional pork." Kessler, supra (reporting Florida Republican Congressman Bill McCollum's opposition to Violent Crime Act).
I Legislation introduced in the 103rd Congress that sought to curb the rising tide ofjuvenile
violence was not limited to the Violent Crime Act. Juvenile Criminal Act of 1994, H.R. 4491,
103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), pending at the close of the 103rd Congress, sought to address
juvenile crime by providing incentives to individual states that will prosecute as adults juveniles
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS
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have also suggested a variety of strategies to diminish the levels of juvenile
delinquency and youth crime.' 0
One strategy increasingly implemented on the local level is the
juvenile curfew ordinance." While the federal government attempts to
reduce juvenile crime through programs such as midnight basketball
leagues, 12 many cities are turning to juvenile curfews as an answer to the
growing problem of juvenile crime and violence. 13 These ordinances are

who commit serious crimes. This bill would have amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1988), to provide funding to states that would
prosecute juveniles 14 years old and older as adults for committing violent crimes. H.R. 4491,
§§ 3, 4 (listing "serious" felonies).
The proposed Juvenile Corrections Act of 1994, S. 2471, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994),
sought to remedy the Violent Crime Act's failure to direct any of the $8 billion appropriated for
prison funding to juvenile detention facilities. See 140 CONG. REC. S13585 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1994) (statement of Sen. Kohl). The bill proposed $772 million in state and local grants over five
years to construct and operate correction facilities for violent juvenile criminals. See 140 CONG.
REC. S14117, 14118 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Sen. Cohen). The bill also laid out
grants to provide juvenile criminals with remedial and vocational education opportunities,
substance abuse programs, and release services and supervision. Id.
" It has been suggested, for example, that a full-employment economy that provides jobs for
at-risk youths would contribute to a decrease in illegal activities, juvenile crime and gang activity
within a community. See C. Ronald Huff, The New Youth Gangs: Social Policy and Malignment
Neglect, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 20, 34-36 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992). Target
youth services and community-based programs would also reduce the number of youths involved
in gangs. Id. at 36-37.
Pre-delinquency intervention programs have also been stressed as a way to prevent juvenile
violence and crime before it actually occurs. See RICHARD J. LUNDMAN, PREVENTION AND
CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 17-18 (1993). These programs focus on identifying and
treating "at risk" juveniles before they become involved in criminal behavior. Such intervention
may be performed on an individualized basis and crafted to curb juvenile crime through
individually-oriented solutions. Id. at 17.
Another method proposed to curb juvenile crime is the use of area projects. Id. Advocates
of these community-based programs contend that youth crime "is a community problem requiring
a community-oriented solution." Id. Area projects focus more on the neighborhood where the
crime occurs and less on the individual juvenile. Id. at 18.
" A curfew is "[a] law (commonly an ordinance) which imposes on people (particularly
children) the obligation to remove themselves from the streets on or before a certain time of
night." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (6th ed. 1990).
11 See supra note 8. The federal government will provide funding for local midnight sports
leagues because these programs are presumed to prevent the increase of "juvenile violence.
juvenile gangs, and the use and the sale of illegal drugs by juveniles." Violent Crime Act § 30201(a)(2)(A). Many opponents of the Violent Crime Act contend that the programs will not
achieve this goal. See Dilulio, supra note 1, at H7943 (describing midnight basketball program
as "silly business"); It Oughta Be A Crime, supra note 8, at 14 (describing Violent Crime Act
components as "goo-goo social welfare programs").
13In the past year, more than 50 municipalities have instituted juvenile curfews. Stepp, supra
note 3, at Al; see also Marc H. Morial, "Our Juvenile Curfew Is Working. " New Orleans,
LouisianaImplements a Juvenile Curfew Law that Involves the Parentsof Curfew Violators, and
Experiences a Significant Drop in Crime; Rethinking Public Safety, NAT'L CITIES WKLY., Jan.
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not a new phenomenon;

4

some cities have longstanding curfews, and the

new movement may merely involve enforcing a law passed decades
earlier.'5 The nation's largest metropolitan areas, such as New York City,

30, 1995, at 2 (describing success of new curfew law); Adam Weintraub, Crime Falls13.2% with
Curfew-Juveniles Are Off Street and Out of Jail, CINCINNATI ENQ., July 2, 1995, at B1
(detailing recently enacted local curfew ordinances throughout Ohio). One city that has recently
instituted a juvenile curfew is Tacoma, Washington. See Florangela Davila, Tacoma Approves
Youth Curfew, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at B1. A unanimous Tacoma city council
approved a juvenile curfew that mirrors a Dallas city ordinance which was upheld by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.; see Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 2134 (1994). The Tacoma curfew, which went into effect January 1, 1995, imposes
fines on minors found on the street between midnight and 6 a.m. See Davila, supra, at B1. The
minors, however, will not be subject to punishment if "accompanied by a parent, heading to, or
returning from work, going home after a school, religious or an adult supervised activity, or
traveling on an interstate highway." Id.
Florida recently enacted a statute providing its municipalities with guidelines for instituting
juvenile curfews. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 877.20-.25 (West 1994). Public support of the
statewide curfew proposal grew in Florida as juvenile violent crimes increased dramatically over
the last decade. Larry Rohter, FloridaGovernmentsMove to Set Teenager Curfews, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1993, at A12. In 1993, 149 juveniles were charged with murder or manslaughter in
Florida, compared with 69 a decade earlier. Id. In addition, juvenile armed robbery arrests rose
from 645 to 1,972 during the same period, and juvenile arrests for aggravated assault or battery
rose from 2,688 to 7,083. Id.
Rather than enacting a statewide curfew, the Florida law provides local counties and
municipalities with the option of adopting local juvenile curfews. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.20
(West 1994); see Rohter, supra (discussing support for statewide curfew). When a municipality
does impose a juvenile curfew, the statute mandates that the locality provide certain exceptions.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.24 (West 1994). The local government may utilize a juvenile curfew
only when it contains these minimum exceptions. Id. § 877.25. The validity of the Florida law,
however, had been in danger after a Florida trial enjoined Dade County's juvenile curfew as
violative of the Florida Constitution. See Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir.
Ct., Sept. 21, 1994), rev'd, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1995);
see also Florida Backs Local Curfew for the Young, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at A26
(discussing Dade County's desire for acceptable curfew ordinance). An appellate court, however,
reversed the trial court decision and permitted Dade County to implement the ordinance.
Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Nov. 1, 1995).
'4 See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 690-91
(Md. 1964)
(discussing history ofjuvenile curfews). Curfews have been used to restrict citizens' movement
since William the Conqueror's invasion of England in the 11th century. Id. at 690. In the United
States, antebellum southern communities used curfews to keep slaves off the streets at night. Id.
In the decades following the Civil War, curfews to restrict juveniles' movements grew in
popularity. Id. at 690-91. By 1900, almost 3,000 American localities employed juvenile curfews.
Id. at 691; see also Peter L. Scherr, Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of A New
Standard of Review, 41 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 164-68 & nn.5-21 (1992)
(providing additional history on curfews).
'5See Neil Morgan, Is Curfew Too Tough on San Diego Juveniles?, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., July 31, 1994, at A2 (discussing recent enforcement of San Diego curfew enacted in
1947).
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have not generally sought to impose juvenile curfews.6 It is in these
areas, however, that juvenile crime and victimization are epidemic.,7

16 In

reaction to these problems, New York State has sought tougher laws for juvenile
criminals. See Joseph B. Treaster, Cuomo Seeks Sterner Laws for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 1994, at Al. In June 1994, a 15-member commission appointed by former Governor Mario
Cuomo to review the problem of rising juvenile violence urged numerous changes to New York
State's juvenile justice system, already considered among the toughest in the United States. Id.
The panel advocated the fingerprinting of juveniles who had committed serious crimes and
recommended that probation and court officials be given greater access to the presently-sealed
records of juvenile criminals. Id. While many of the recommendations focused on post-arrest
situations, former Governor Cuomo also stressed the need for strong prevention programs. Id.
Above all, Cuomo stressed the need to control laws and agencies that often leave juvenile
criminals with a sense that no one in authority cares about their criminal activity or its
consequences. Id.; see also Anthony N. Destafano, Cuomo's Plan Would Send More Violent
Teens to Grown-Up Court, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1994, at A22 (discussing plan to add to list of
crimes for which juveniles may be prosecuted as adults in New York). Opponents charge that the
changes in the juvenile offender laws will not reduce juvenile crime or violence. Treaster, supra.
According to Gail Nayowith, Executive Director of Citizens Committee for Children of New
York, "[tihere is a very dearly held belief that we can use the criminal justice system to reduce
juvenile crime. But, in fact, it hasn't worked. . . . [The Juvenile Offender Law] has not reduced
juvenile crime. In fact, juvenile crime has increased." Id.
The New York Police Department and the City's Board of Education have created a truancy
program to catch teenagers who skip school. See Ashley Dunn, Crackdown on TruantBy Police
Find216, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at B4; Clifford Krauss, PoliceDelay Rounding Up Truant
Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, at B1. Under the plan, certain police officers are assigned
to curb crime and mischief committed by youths during the school hours. Id. The plan permits
police officers who have engaged in special sensitivity training to patrol areas in search of truants.
Dunn, supra. If a youth is found on the street during school hours, the police officer may ask the
youth for identification. Id. If the officer determines that the youth is a truant, the officer may
take the youth to a collection point in an area school, and parents and school officials are notified.
Id. Thereafter, the student is released and sent back to his school. Id. On the day the program
was put into effect, police detained 216 youths. Id.
In the past, New York City police officials have opposed a juvenile curfew, citing the
force's inability to enforce the provisions. See Paul M. Cahill, Nonemergency Municipal Curfew
Ordinances and the Liberty Interest of Minors, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 532 n.87 (1984).
The Department has contended that a juvenile curfew would be too difficult to enforce. Id. (citing
telephone interview with Lt. Butler, Youth Services Division, New York City Police
Department). The large number of legitimate nighttime activities and police programs aimed at
preventing juvenile crime illustrate the potential ineffectiveness of ajuvenile curfew in New York
City. Id.; cf.NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE AND CHARTER §3-105(1)(b), (3)(a) (1993)

(stating curfew may be established in New York City restricting pedestrian and motor vehicle
traffic to fire, police, emergency repair crews and medical personnel if mayor has declared state
of emergency).
'7 From January through December, 1993, over 200 juveniles were arrested
for murder in
New York City, while 164 youths faced rape charges. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVICES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM (1994). Furthermore, juveniles ac-

counted for over 9000 robbery arrests and over 1100 burglary arrests during that period. Id.
Additionally, nearly 2000 New York City juveniles faced dangerous weapons charges in 1993.
Id. In total, approximately 12,400 juveniles were arrested for these violent felonies in 1993, up
from the 11,658 juveniles arrested for all felonies in 1990. Id.; see also Emily Sacher, When
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Some critics view curfews as a public relations ploy that soothes the
public's fear about crime without producing the desired results., 8 The
impracticability of curfews has been a serious complaint among police
forces in cities that employ a curfew. 9 Statistics indicate, however, that
juvenile curfews, once implemented, can significantly reduce the levels of

Johnny Totes a Gun, NEWSDAY, Oct. 28, 1990, at 6 (discussing increase in juvenile criminal
activities in New York City).
New York ranks first among the 50 states in the violent crime arrest rate for youths aged
10 to 17, at 980 per 100,000 youths. G. Oliver Kopell, BarMust Fight Violent Crime Plaguing
State, N.Y. L.J., May 2, 1994, at 53. In 1992, 65 youths younger than 16 were arrested in New
York for murder. Not Just Kid Stuff, NEWSDAY, July 24, 1994, at 33. The number ofjuveniles
arrested for robbery and aggravated assault jumped from 3,471 to 5,232 and from 1,570 to 2,438,
respectively, between 1983 and 1992. Id. Between January and December of 1993, juveniles
16 years old and younger accounted for 135 homicide-related arrests in New York State. NEW
YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, supra. More significantly, the number
of robberies has skyrocketed, from approximately 5,200 to over 10,000 in 1993. Id. In 1993,
police officers in New York State arrested nearly 22,000 juveniles on charges of murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary. Id.
This plague ofjuvenile violence and crime that confronts New York City has been evident
in juvenile activity known as "wilding." Bill Reel, It's Open Season-for Wolf Packs, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 8, 1992, at 40; Felicia R. Lee, Loose-Knit Type of Youth Gangs Troubling Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at B3; Timothy Clifford, 4 Linked to Earlier "Wilding, "NEWSDAY, June
10, 1989, at 7; Richard Esposito et al., Police Charge 7 Teenagers in BrutalAttack on Jogger;
Gang of 33 Roamed the Park, NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1989, at 5. "Wilding" is a term used to
describe the conduct of "loosely organized groups of young people who rob, rape or kill for
money or fun." Lee, supra. The term came to be associated with the gang rape of a jogger by
seven youths in Central Park on the evening of April 21, 1989. See Esposito, supra. Not
surprisingly, four of the youths involved in this gang rape had been involved in another "wilding"
attack one week earlier. Clifford, supra.
"sSee Juvenile Curfews are No Fix atAll, CONN. L. TRIB., May 30, 1994, at 21 (criticizing
juvenile curfew as quick fix). "Juvenile curfew laws may fulfill the feel-good notion that we are
doing something about the juvenile crime problem, but do virtually nothing to address the
underlying purpose for their passage." Id. The juvenile curfew has been described as merely part
of the "frenzy" to do something about juvenile crime, a "popular local fad" that has no real
import or effect on crime. After Dark, ECONOMIST, May 5. 1994, at 5. In fact, these laws are
often enforced against juveniles who lie about their age or possess false identification. Id. More
importantly, critics contend that curfews are ineffective because mostjuvenile crimes occur during
daylight hours. Id. (arguing that four-fifths of violent crime occurs during daytime hours);
Juvenile Curfews are No Fix at All, supra ("Statistics around the country reveal that there is no
more crime committed by the juvenile during nighttime, nor are juveniles becoming victims more
during nighttime as opposed to daytime hours.").
, See Eric Hanson & T.J. Milling, Police Net First Curfew Law Arrests, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 15, 1992, at 1 (reporting that police officers complain Houston's juvenile curfew law is
flawed); Jim Cudney, Teen Curfew a Waste of Policemen'sTime, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 29, 1993,
at 3 ("I haven't met one patrol officer yet who believes a curfew law would have any significant
impact."). Curfews are seen as time-consuming and unrealistic, and add to the many problems
facing police officers engaged in juvenile justice procedures. Id.; see also Pred v. Dade County,
No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 6 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1994) (reporting testimony of former
Miami Chief of Police thatjuvenile curfew would be counter-productive use ofpolice manpower).
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juvenile crime. 20 Nevertheless, the American Civil Liberties Union and

some legal commentators have labeled these measures unconstitutional; 21
throughout the 1980's and 1990's, a number of federal and state courts
agreed.' Despite the debate, the United States Supreme Court has never
o Rick Bragg, Children Strike Fearinto Grown-Up Hearts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at
Al (discussing juvenile crime in New Orleans). Between January and November of 1994, only
18 of 391 murders resulted in an arrest of a juvenile in New Orleans, compared to 31 of the 389
murders that resulted in a juvenile arrest in 1993. Id. Police attribute this decrease to the city's
juvenile curfew. Id.; see also Christopher Cooper & Walt Philbin, New Orleans Credits its
Curfewfor June's Drop in Crime, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 1, 1994, at Al. The Mayor's office
claimed that in the first month after the curfew's implementation, murders committed during
curfew hours dropped 13 %, armed robbery decreased 26%, burglary dropped 11% and assaults
were reduced by 9%. Id. But see Frank Donze, Prove Curfew Cutting Crime Rate, ACLU Tells
City, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 15, 1994, at B3 (reporting that ACLU challenged credibility of
evidence that juvenile curfew has reduced crime).
Other municipalities employing curfews have also witnessed a drop in juvenile crime. See
Mary Jo Pitzel & Eric Miller, Crime Studies Give CandidatesPoliticalAmmo, ARIZ. REP., Sept.
8, 1994, at BI (noting that Phoenix curfew resulted in 10.4% decrease in juvenile violent crime
arrests); Ruth Rendon, StringentJuvenile Curfew PayingOfffor Pasadena,Hous. CHRON., Nov.
28, 1993, at C3 (officials describe Pasadena curfew as effective); Laura Laughlin, New Curfew
Wins Praisein Phoenix, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at A5 (indicating that curfew reduced gangrelated violence, juvenile crime and victimization); Diana Balazs, PeoriaJuvenile Curfew Called
Success by Police, ARIZ. REP., Aug. 27, 1993, at 1 (reporting that local curfew ordinance
reduced juvenile crime and victimization, and was well received by local police).
2 See Robyn E. Blummer, More and More Cities Are Adopting Them, But Are They
Constitutional?Yes: Safety is a FundamentalRight; No: Curfews TreatLaw-Abiding Teens Like
Criminals, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 41. The ACLU contends that these ordinances violate
minors' fundamental civil liberties regardless of any exceptions or defenses contemplated by the
curfew law. Id. The result, they argue, is that juveniles are "placed under virtual house arrest
every night with no charges levied, no right to counsel and no trial." Id.; see also James Gill.
ACLU's Drive to Scrap City's Curfew, TIMES-PICAYUNE. Sept. 16, 1994, at B7 (discussing
Louisiana ACLU chapter's fight against New Orleans' curfew).
Some legal commentators also contend that juvenile curfews are unconstitutional. See
Cahill, supra note 16, at 558-59 (arguing that non-emergency juvenile curfews are unconstitutional unless limited to "loitering-prowling"); Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental
Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163 (1984) [hereinafter
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution] (arguing that juvenile curfews serve no state interest
sufficient to justify curtailing minors' fundamental rights of movement and association); see also
Jonathan Hangartner, Comment, The Constitutionalityof LargeScale Police Tactics: Implications
for the Right ofIntrastate Travel, 14 PACE L. REV. 203 (1994) (commenting that police sweeps
act as de facto curfew, violating constitutional rights).
I See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); Waters v. Barry,
711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H.
1984); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd on othergrounds,
668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982); Frank 0., 247 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); K.L.J. v.
Florida, 581 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21
(Fla. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1994), rev'd, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov.
1, 1995); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992); Brown v. Ashton, 611
A.2d 594 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d. 478 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1987). Contra Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
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affirmatively addressed the constitutionality of any juvenile curfew.3
A recent case, however, strongly suggests that a properly drafted

juvenile curfew ordinance can survive constitutional scrutiny.24 In Qutb
v. Strauss,2s the Fifth Circuit upheld a Dallas, Texas, juvenile curfew law
under both the United States and Texas Constitutions.' The court held
that the statute was narrowly tailored to implement the state's compelling
interest in protecting the welfare of its young citizens and, thus, out-

weighed the rights of minors to remain in public places beyond designated
hours. 27

In Qutb, parents of teenage children residing in Dallas filed suit
against the city seeking a temporary restraining order and a permanent
injunction against the implementation of the juvenile curfew ordinance.'
The plaintiffs asserted that Dallas' juvenile curfew violated their rights
under the United States and Texas constitutions.29 The city, apparently
hoping to circumvent the lawsuit, amended the juvenile curfew (prior to the
district court's decision) to incorporate additional defenses and omit certain
troublesome provisions." In addition, the Dallas City Council voluntarily

Ct. 2134 (1994); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); In re Juvenile, No. JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); People ex rel J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989);
Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (I1. App. Ct. 1990); City of Panora v.
Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis.
1988).
1 But see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's denial of certiorari, insisting that the
Court should address the issue of "whether the due process rights of juveniles are entitled to
lesser protection than those of adults," because "this case poses a substantial constitutional
question-one which is of importance to thousands of towns with similar ordinances." Id. at 96566.
4See infra note 25 and accompanying text. But cf.supra note 22 and accompanying text.
5 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 492.
8Id. at 496-99 (citing DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE [hereinafter DALLAS CODE] Ch. 31, § 3133 (1992)).
29Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491 n.4. The plaintiffs maintained the following: (1) the juvenile curfew
violated the minors' First Amendment right to free speech and association; (2) the ordinance also
infringed the minors' constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure; (3) the juvenile
curfew ordinance took away the minors' right to a presumption of innocence, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and freedom against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; (4) the youth curfew violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) the curfew was both overbroad and vague. Id.
1.Id. at 491. The plaintiffs, however, merely amended their complaint and the district court
granted another evidentiary hearing to determine if the amended ordinance violated the minors'
and parents' various constitutional rights. Id.
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delayed the implementation of the curfew until the federal court ruled. 31
The district court ruled, however, that the curfew violated the minors'
Equal Protection and First Amendment rights and enjoined its implementation.32 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.33
Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Jolly stated that the ordinance
implicated the Equal Protection Clause' because it interfered with minors'
fundamental right to move freely throughout the city and treated minors
differently than adults. 35 Because a fundamental right was involved, the
court evaluated the ordinance under a strict scrutiny analysis. 36 To survive

such analysis, a statute must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest.37 The parties and the district court agreed that the state had
a compelling interest in authorizing the curfew.3 1 Thus, the remaining
issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit was whether the ordinance was
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest.39 The court held that
the amended ordinance was narrowly tailored to satisfy the compelling
government interest of reducing juvenile crime and victimization,'

Id.; see Anne Belli Gesalman & Sylvia Martinez, Curfew for Teens Upheld, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 23, 1993, at, 1; Eric Hanson, Curfew Goes into Force, HOUS. POST, Nov.
9, 1991, at 1.
32 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491. Specifically, the district court concluded that the juvenile curfew
ordinance "created a classification that could not withstand constitutional scrutiny." Id. The
court, however, did not reach the plaintiffs' other claims because it ruled in favor of the minors'
Equal Protection and First Amendment claims. Id. at 491 n.5.
3

31Id. at 490.

3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1 ("No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
3 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492. The court did not expressly determine whether the United States or
Texas Constitutions provided the minors with a fundamental right to movement. See id. ("[W]e
assume without deciding that the right to move freely is a fundamental right."). Legal commentators also have contended that minors possess this fundamental right. See, e.g., Hangartner, supra
note 21 (asserting that First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses support
minors' right to intrastate travel). Courts have also interpreted the U.S. Constitution to provide
this right to minors. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989); City
of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 338 (Wis. 1988). Butsee City of Panora v. Simmons,
445 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to hold that right to intracity travel is fundamental
for due process purposes), People ex rel J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) (holding minor's
liberty interest in freedom of movement not fundamental).
36 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.

31Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982)).

3 Id. at 492. Dallas' interest in a juvenile curfew was to "reduce juvenile crime and
victimization, while promoting juvenile safety and well-being." Id. The parents and the district
court agreed with the city's assertion that its stated intention was compelling. Id.
31Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493.
1 Id. at 493-96. The Fifth Circuit maintained that the data on Dallas juvenile crime
established the requisite nexus between the compelling state interest and the classification of
juveniles covered by the ordinance. Id. at 493-94. Additionally, the court concluded that the
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characterizing the curfew as an incidental burden on the minors' constitutional right to travel during curfew hours.4

It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit correctly decided Qutb in
accordance with current constitutional principles, even though many
previous state and federal courts have overturned other such ordinances.
This case should serve as a model for constitutionally sound juvenile
curfew ordinances because the Dallas ordinance lacked the defects cited by
other courts in prior curfew cases. This Comment will propose that the
rationale articulated and implied by Qutb provides the specifications

required for a juvenile curfew ordinance to survive federal constitutional
scrutiny. Part I will examine the Dallas juvenile curfew ordinance and
suggest that the constitutionality of such a curfew depends on the
exemptions the law provides. Part II will explore the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim and contend that the Fifth Circuit's holding was the correct
response to the litigant's arguments. This section will also critically
examine the strict scrutiny test employed by the Qutb court and propose

that a thorough strict scrutiny analysis would produce the same result, even
in light of prior federal court holdings that rejected other municipal curfew

curfew was not so generally broad that it defeated the requirement for a narrowly tailored
ordinance. Id. at 493-95. The curfew ordinance provided a number of exceptions and defenses
which made the curfew narrowly drawn. "To be sure, the defenses are the most important
consideration in determining whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored." Id. at 493-94. The court
distinguished the Dallas juvenile curfew from the curfew ordinance held unconstitutional in
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494. The Dallas
curfew provided a number of defenses, most notably an exception for First Amendment activities
during curfew hours. Id. at 498 (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33 (c)(1)(H)). On the other
hand, the Johnson curfew did not provide a defense for the exercise of these rights. See Johnson,
658 F.2d at 1072.
41 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495. The restriction on minors' ability to attend a midnight movie
without adult supervision, or to gaze unchaperoned at the stars in a public park during curfew
hours was substantially outweighed by the state's interest in protecting the child from juvenile
crime and violence. Id.
The equal protection claim was not the sole issue addressed in Qutb. The parents also
argued that the curfew violated their fundamental right to rear their children as they see fit. Id.;
cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (involving parents' assertions that ban on
selling obscene materials to minors violated their fundamental child-rearing right). The Qutb
court concluded, however, that the numerous exceptions to the curfew enabled parents to make
decisions regarding their children's movement in all situations except where the child is in a
public place, alone, during curfew hours. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495-96.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the minors' claim that the juvenile curfew violated
their First Amendment right of association. Id. at 495 n.9. The court determined that minors'
rights to associate with each other was not a protected right under the United States or Texas
Constitution. Id.
Judge King concurred in the result without expressing his view on the method employed by
the court to reach its conclusion. Id. at 495.
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Finally, Part III will discuss the impact that Qutb may have on

future juvenile curfews.
I.

THE DALLAS CURFEW

In June of 1991, the Dallas City Council approved a city-wide juvenile
curfew,42 thereby joining other cities that have implemented juvenile
curfews to reduce high rates of juvenile violence. 43 The Dallas City

Council believed that the ordinance was warranted by increasing rates of
juvenile crime and gang violence.' The city viewed the law as an
instrument that would quell the juvenile crime problem without placing an
undue burden on the constitutional rights of minors and their parents.'
The provisions of the Dallas juvenile curfew illustrate this balance.'
The curfew bars persons under the age of seventeen from "public places"
or "establishments" between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Sunday
through Thursday, and between midnight and 6:00 a.m. on Friday and

42 See DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33. Originally proposed by residents of South Dallas. the
Dallas City Council approved the juvenile curfew ordinance by a 10-1 vote. See Dallas Council
Approves 11 P.M. Curfew for Teen-Agers, Hous. POST, June 13, 1991, at A31.
43See Curfew for Juveniles, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 41 (listing Phoenix, Milwaukee,
Atlanta, Buffalo, Tampa, Newark, N.J. and Hartford, Conn. as employing juvenile curfew).
Atlanta, Detroit and Los Angeles had already imposed a youth curfew at the time Dallas passed
its curfew ordinance. See Dallas Council Approves 11 P.M. Curfew for Teen-Agers, supra note
42.
44See Dallas CouncilApproves 11P.M. Curfew for Teen-Agers, supra note 42; Gesalman &
Martinez, supra note 31. In 1990, the Dallas police reported 5425 juvenile arrests for various
offenses, an increase of almost 300 arrests from the previous year. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493
(citing statistics presented by city at district court hearing). These arrests included 40 murders,
91 sexual assaults, 233 robberies and 230 aggravated assaults. Id. Moreover, the juvenile crime
problem appeared to be worsening in 1991. From January to April, 1991, 21 juveniles had been
arrested for murder, 36 for sexual offenses, 128 for robbery, and 107 for aggravated assault.
Id. The city argued that the crimes of murder, rape and aggravated assault were more likely to
occur during the hours covered by a potential curfew. Id.
4-Dallas Mayor Steve Bartlett stressed that the purpose of the curfew law was to get the
youths off the dangerous streets after midnight, not to arrest teenagers. Gesalman & Martinez,
supra note 31. The goals of the curfew included: reducing the number ofjuvenile crime victims
and injuries caused by accidents involving youths during the curfew hours; lessening the periods
law enforcement officers must spend in the field addressing juvenile crime: decreasing the number
of juveniles who stay out late because of peer pressure to do so; increasing options for dealing
with gang problems; and helping parents control their children's nocturnal activities. Qutb, 11
F.3d at 494 n.8.
I See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496-99 (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33). In fact, in the first
six months after the curfew has been in force, Dallas Police reported that juvenile arrests and
victimization decreased by 15%. Mark Potok, Teen Curfews 'The Norm' in More Cities, USA
TODAY, June 26, 1995, at Al.
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Saturday. 47 The ordinance contains a detailed definition section intended
to reduce any confusion surrounding language such as "public place" and
"establishment. ' 4 More specifically, the Dallas law provides nine
"

exemptions

to prosecution under the ordinance.4 9 These defenses,

47 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 497 (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, §§ 31-33(a)(1)(A), (B)). The curfew
not only punishes the minor for a curfew violation, id. (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 3133(b)(1)) but also restricts a parent from knowingly allowing the minor to remain in a public
place or establishment during curfew hours. Id. (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(b)(2)).
The curfew also prohibits owners, operators, or employees of establishments from allowing the
minor to remain on those premises during the curfew. Id. (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 3133(b)(3)).
43 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 497 (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(b)). The juvenile curfew
ordinance must contain a detailed definition section to prevent a reviewing court from voiding the
curfew on vagueness grounds. Courts have held juvenile curfew ordinances to be unconstitutionally vague when the ordinance contained broad and ambiguous terms that substantially
affected thejuvenile's conduct. See Allen v. Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478,481-82 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) (holding "reasonable judgment," "emergency errand" and "legitimate business"
unconstitutionally vague due to subjective basis which results in discriminatory enforcement); In
re Frank 0., 247 Cal. Rptr 655, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting Long Beach, Ca. curfew
because vague terms allowed for arbitrary and erratic implementation); Brown v. Ashton, 611
A.2d 599, 609 (Md. App. 1992) (holding that term "bona fide organization" lacks detailed
definition and is unconstitutionally vague). To survive a vagueness claim, a juvenile curfew
ordinance should contain a precisely worded, detailed definition section. See Natalie M. Williams,
Comment: Updated Guidlinesfor Juvenile Curfews: City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 79 IowA L.
REV. 465, 475-76 (1994).
41Qutb, 11 F.3d at 498 (citing DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(c)). Section 31-33(c)
provides in part:
It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (b) that the minor was:
(A) accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
(B) on an errand at the direction of the minor's parent or guardian, without any detour
or stop;
(C) in a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel;
(D) engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an
employment activity, without detour or stop;
(E)involved in an emergency;
(F) on the sidewalk abutting the minor's residence or abutting the residence of a nextdoor neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the
minor's presence;
(G) attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by
adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civic organization, or another similar
entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from,
without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity
supervised by adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civil organization, or
another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor;
(H) exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution,
such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; or
(I) married or had been married or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance
with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code.
DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(c).
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however, do not cover every activity in which a child may be innocently

involved during the curfew hours.50 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
determined that minors' rights regarding involvement in these non-exempt
activities did not outweigh the compelling need for a juvenile curfew.5'
In the past, courts have overturned juvenile curfew ordinances if they

lacked sufficient protection for activities in which minors might constitutionally be involved during curfew hours.52 In Wters v. Barry,53 for
example, the federal district court overturned a Washington, D.C. curfew
law54 that provided five such exemptions,55 including situations in which
the minor was with a parent,56 returning home within sixty minutes after
the end of a pre-registered educational, religious, or non-profit sponsored

I Specifically, the district court asserted that the defenses do not protect juveniles who attend
concerts, films, plays, non-supervised, non-sponsored midnight sports league games or innocent
strolls in the public park to gaze at the stars. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494-95.
5' Id. at 495. The Fifth Circuit faulted the district court for the manner in which the court
examined the defenses. Id. A juvenile could attend a late-night activity if he or she was
accompanied by a parent or guardian. Id. Additionally, the examples of a midnight basketball
game or youth group event usually involve adult supervision and are exceptions under the
ordinance. See DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33 (c)(1)(G). The minor may even attend a party
beyond curfew hours as long as a parent supervised the event. See id.
Moreover, the juvenile was not actually deprived of attending those cultural or entertainment
events listed by the district court. Instead, the curfew law merely required the juvenile who
wished to attend the event unchaperoned to attend the matinee show. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495. Thus,
the ordinance was not depriving minors of an activity because they could take part in the activity
at an earlier time. Stargazing, an activity that could only be done at night, could not only be

performed in a public park until 11:00 p.m., but the minor could watch the stars all night if he
or she remained on the sidewalk in front of his or her home. Id.
2 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating
law because ordinance failed to exclude minors involved in First Amendment activities);
McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H. 1984) (finding ordinance
unconstitutional for failing to include defense encompassing minors' fundamental right to
movement), rev'd on othergrounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1985); K.L.J. v. Florida, 581 So.
2d 920, 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (striking down Jacksonville curfew law as unable to
"apprise parties as to what conduct is permissible"); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d
179, 183 (Iowa 1992) (holding juvenile curfew unconstitutionally overbroad because not drawn
narrowly to provide exception for emancipated minors and First Amendment fundamental rights).
13711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
1 Id. at 1128 (citing WASHINGTON, D.C. TEMPORARY CURFEW EMERGENCY ACT of 1989,
D.C. LAW 8-20 [hereinafter WASHINGTON ACT]). The plaintiffs' class included juveniles, young
adults and individuals associated with religious organizations. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1128. The
plaintiffs asserted that the curfew contained a number of constitutional infirmities. Id. at 1132-40.
Specifically, the court held that the juvenile curfew violated the minors' right to movement under
the First Amendment right to assembly and association as well as their substantive due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1134-35. Additionally, the curfew violated the minors'
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection rights. Id. at 1138-40.
5 See id. at 1141 (citing WASHINGTON ACT § 4(d)).

Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1141 (citing WASHINGTON ACT § 4(d)(1)).
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event,7 or traveling by motor vehicle. 8 While the court commended
the city for including these exceptions, 59 it was more disturbed by the
actual imposition of a juvenile curfew than by the defenses provided.6
It is clear, however, based on the existing cases, that the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew depends on the number and types of defenses it
contains. Under equal protection analysis, the validity of the law depends
on the presence of certain defenses which ensure that it is "narrowly
tailored" to satisfy the compelling state interests involved. 6' Similarly, the

inclusion of defenses for activities protected by the First Amendment would
be necessary to defeat overbreadth challenges to the law.62 When exam-

See id. (citing WASHINGTON AcT § 4(d)(2)).
"3See id. (citing WASHINGTON ACT § 4(d)(3)). The Washington, D.C. juvenile curfew also
provided a defense for a minor if he is returning home from a job as long as the minor possesses
a copy of his or her working papers. See id. at 1141 (citing WASHINGTON ACT § 4(d)(4)).
Finally, the ordinance contained a two-part emergency clause. It exempts the minor, who is a
custodial parent, on an emergency errand directly related to his or her child's health and also a
minor who is on an emergency errand for a parent and possesses a note from the parent. See id.
(citing WASHINGTON ACT §§ 4(d)(5)(A) and (B)).
59"These exemptions represent a laudable effort on the District's part to conform the Act to
the requirements of the Constitution." Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1135.
" []
l tis what
60 For the district court, the number of defenses under the curfew was irrelevant.
these curfews restrict, and not what they exempt, that matters the most." Id. at 1136. By its very
nature, the Washington, D.C. juvenile curfew prohibited more juveniles from innocently moving
about than prevented those juveniles who used the curfew hours to commit illegal activities. Id.
at 1136. Even with its defenses, the Washington curfew was held to "'broadly stifle' the
fundamental liberty interests of thousands of perfectly innocent, law-abiding juveniles who live
in or who may visit the District of Columbia." Id.
61Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1993) ("To be sure, the defenses are the
most important consideration in determining whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored."), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994); see City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Wis.
1988) (concluding juvenile curfew ordinance drawn "as narrowly as practicable").
Waters did not evaluate the defenses to determine whether the curfew act was narrowly
tailored. That court believed logic was "perhaps most fatal to the Act's constitutionality."
Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139. The curfew was not narrowly tailored because it lacked the logical
fit between the compelling state interest and the classification created by the ordinance. Id.
Therefore, this conclusion prevented the court from determining whether the defenses acted to
narrowly tailor the juvenile curfew law.
62The failure to draft the curfew with an exception for First Amendment activities should
result in an unconstitutional curfew. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065,
1074(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that curfew unconstitutionally swept within ambit innocent activities
protected by First Amendment); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa
1992) (determining juvenile curfew unconstitutional since ordinance lacked exception for minors'
freedom of movement when acting in conjunction with First Amendment rights); Allen v. City
of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (ruling juvenile curfew
unconstitutionally overbroad because law contained sweeping restrictions on minors' fundamental
right to free speech, religion and assembly). But see City of Milwaukee, 426 N.W.2d at 339
(concluding that curfew lacking specific First Amendment defense was not substantially
overbroad); In re Juvenile, No. JT 9065297, 887 P.2d 599, 609 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
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ined in this light, the Qutb holding is consistent with W4ters,63 as the
Dallas curfew contained nearly twice the number of defenses of the

Washington, D.C. curfew, and the Dallas exceptions were more expansive.'

It was the breadth of these defenses that prevented the Dallas

curfew was not overbroad when liberally construed to contain First Amendment defense).
The overbreadth doctrine invalidates a law when it "does not aim specifically at evils within
the allowable area of state control but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that...
constitute an exercise" of First Amendment rights. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)
(holding criminal statute that prohibited picketing in front of business establishments unconstitutional because it barred First Amendment right to peaceful picketing). The overbreadth doctrine
is confined to litigation relating to the First Amendment. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvins, 407
U.S. 163, 168 (1972). A state statute can potentially violate a person's First Amendment rights
because the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
The Fifth Circuit did not address the plaintiff's challenge that the Dallas juvenile curfew was
unconstitutionally overbroad. See Qutb, 11 F.3d. at 491 n.5. It is submitted the Dallas law
cannot be deemed overbroad since the curfew law provided a defense for First Amendment
activity.
6 Reviewing the Dallas juvenile curfew ordinance, District Court Judge Buchmeyer
apparently adopted the Waters rationale, concluding that "[i]t is what the Ordinance restricts...
and not what it exempts that matters the most." Id. at 493 (alteration in original). The Fifth
Circuit, however, rebuked this rationale because the ordinance's defenses were vital to the
curfew's constitutionality. "[lit is clear to us that neither the restrictions of the curfew ordinance
nor its defenses can be viewed in isolation from each other; the ordinance can be examined fairly
only when the defenses are considered as part of the whole." Id. at 493. The presence of the nine
enumerated defenses must be considered in conjunction with the prohibitions the curfew sustains.
It appears, therefore, that the Waters court improperly examined the Washington, D.C. juvenile
curfew because the court placed only a limited emphasis on the curfew's exemptions.
I The defenses provided by the WASHINGTON ACT were inferior to the exemptions the
DALLAS CODE provides to minors. The Dallas ordinance allows a guardian to accompany a
juvenile to a public place during curfew hours. The corresponding D.C. provision only allowed
the minor's parent to be with the minor. Compare DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(c)(1)(A) with
WASHINGTON ACT § 4(d)(1). During curfew, a Dallas minor can be in a public place if his
presence involves an emergency. DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(C)(1)(E). The Washington,
D.C. curfew, however, would require a similarly situated minor to possess a note from his
parents, if it was practicable. WASHINGTON AcT § 4(d)(5)(B). A minor who was a custodial
parent could break the curfew if involved in an emergency relating to his or her child's health
as long as the juvenile parent could explain the emergency if stopped by police. WASHINGTON
AcT § 4(d)(5)(B).
The Washington youths were required to return home within one hour following the
departure of an educational, religious, or non-profit sponsored activity. WASHINGTON ACT
§ 4(d)(2)(C). While he or she must return home directly after leaving an activity sponsored by
the city, civic association, or similar entity, a Dallas youth does not face a time limit. See
DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(c)(1)(G).
More important, however, was the failure of the D.C. curfew to provide minors with certain
exemptions that are included in the Dallas ordinance. Absent from the D.C. Act is an exemption
for minors who violate curfew hours in an exercise of their "First Amendment rights protected
by the United States Constitution, such as free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the
right to assembly." See DALLAS CODE, ch. 31, § 31-33(c)(1)(H). Under the Dallas ordinance,
the minor can perform any errand at the direction of his or her parent or guardian. Id. § 31-
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curfew from impermissibly stifling constitutional rights.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The central issue in Qutb was whether the Dallas juvenile curfew
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.65
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as a "direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike." 66 The Dallas ordinance
treats certain "persons similarly situated" differently because the law's
prohibitions relate only to persons under seventeen and not to adults.67
This discrimination required the Fifth Circuit to analyze the statute under
the Equal Protection Clause.6"

Courts employ one of two tests to determine whether a governmentcreated classification violates the Equal Protection Clause, depending upon
the right or classification at issue. 69 If the state action burdens a "funda-

71
mental right"70 or the classification disadvantages a "suspect class,"

33(e)(1)(E). Additionally, the Dallas law exempts all married, divorced, and emancipated minors.
Id. § 31-33(c)(1)(I). Finally, a minor can remain on his or her sidewalk or neighbor's sidewalk,
unless the neighbor complains to the police, during curfew hours. Id. § 31-33(c)(1)(F).
I Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491 n.5; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("No state shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Qutb addressed the Free
Association issue in a footnote. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495 n.9. Freedom of association has been
deemed worthy of constitutional protection. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984) (discussing "freedom of intimate association" and "freedom of expressive association").
Certain types of association, however, are not a part of the minor's penumbra of fundamental
rights. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (refusing to recognize
"generalized right of 'social association' [including] chance encounters in dance halls" as
constitutionally protected). The Fifth Circuit found that this was "precisely the type of association
we are primarily concerned with in this case." Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495 n.9. Therefore, the juvenile
curfew did not infringe upon the minors' constitutional right to association. Id.
But see Waters, 711 F. Supp at 1134 n. 16 ("Unlike the ordinance at issue in Stanglin, the
[juvenile curfew] Act operates in much more of a blunderbuss fashion . . . effectively prohibit[ing] on its face forms of nocturnal expression and association that would clearly fall within the
ambit of the First Amendment."); Susan M. Horowitz, Note, A Search for Constitutional
Standards:JudicialReviewofJuvenileCurfew Ordinances,24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 381,
396 (distinguishing Stanglin holding from juvenile curfew ordinance because "the ordinance in
Stanglin concerned a specific arena, while curfew encompasses a large, general vicinity and
results in more indiscriminate restriction of freedoms").
I See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
67Qutb, 11 F.3d at492 ("[I]t is clear that the curfew ordinance distinguishes between classes
of individuals on the basis on [sic] age, treating those persons under the age of seventeen
differently from those persons age seventeen and older.").
6 Id.
69See id.
70 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n. 15 (1982) ("In determining whether a class-based

denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, we
look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or implicitly,
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such action or classification will be constitutional only if it survives "strict
scrutiny." 72 If such rights or classifications are not implicated, the court
applies a rational basis test.73 In Qutb, the court held that the classification
established by the juvenile curfew did not disadvantage a suspect class. 74
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit inquired whether the Dallas law impinged upon

a fundamental constitutional right. 75
A.

Minors' FundamentalRights
Minors possess certain fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitu7
6
tion and are accorded a "significant measure of First Amendment
therein."); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (holding that
rights are fundamental when "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"): San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (determining that right is fundamental
when "explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937) (recognizing that certain fundamental rights are "found to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty").
A number of rights are implicit within the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment concept of
"liberty." See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (right to marry); Moore, 431
U.S. at 499 (personal choice in matters of family life); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (procreation); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 665 (1966) (vote); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 211 (holding minor's right to education nonfundamental but highly protected).
"' See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (describing composition of suspect
classification). The traditional indicia of a "suspect" classification entails a finding that (1) the
class has been saddled with certain disabilities as a result of the discrimination, (2) the class has
been subjected "to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment," or (3) the class has been
relegated "to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." Id. The Fourteenth Amendment abolishes legislation that
imposes disadvantages on groups "disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control."
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 n.14.
7 To validate state action under strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that the law is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 216-17; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 638 (1969). Laurence Tribe notes that "there are very few cases which strictly
scrutinize and yet uphold instances of impaired fundamental rights." LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1452 (2d ed. 1988).
73See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 40. Under a rational basis test, the state
action will be upheld if the state can show a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. Id.
74Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 ("[N]o one has argued, and correctly so, that a classification based
on age is a suspect classification."). Age is not a suspect classification. See Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991). Prior to Gregory, other courts had refused to hold that a juvenile
curfew created a suspect class based on age. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401
F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'dper curiam, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied.
429 U.S. 964 (1976).
75Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
76 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding abortion statute
requiring parental consent violated minors' right to privacy). The United States Constitution vests
children with many of the same rights possessed by adults. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv.
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protection. "I The First Amendment has been interpreted to establish
fundamental rights to movement and travel.78 Legal commentators argue
that these fundamental rights should apply to minors as well.7 9
Courts reviewing juvenile curfews, however, have split on this critical

question.' ° This issue is significant because a conclusion that a minor does

Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to possess and purchase contraception); Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519, 531-32 (1975) (holding that Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause applies to
minors); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969)
(prohibiting minors from wearing black armbands violates their First Amendment rights).
77Eronzck v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975) (holding that minor has First
Amendment right of access to non-obscene material); see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14 (upholding
minors' First Amendment rights of speech and expression).
78An adult's right to travel is worthy of constitutional protection, regardless of the adult's
destination. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) ("[F]reedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.")
(quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757 (1966)); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (indicating that right to wander, stroll, or loaf is protected by
Constitution because "[fthese unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our
people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity"); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (asserting fundamental right to interstate travel because
"the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout. . . our land"); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125-26 (1968) ("The right to travel is part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.. . [fireedom of movement is
basic in our scheme of values."); Apthker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964)
(striking down law that prohibited application for passport because regulation broadly restricted
fundamental right to travel abroad).
71See Hangartner, supra note 21, at 227 (arguing minors' right to intrastate travel should be
explicitly recognized as fundamental right under Due Process clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supra note 21, at 1174 (contending that
minors' fundamental rights include movement and association).
While the Supreme Court has insisted that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone," In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1969) (citations omitted), the Court
has not considered "the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the State." Id. At one point, however, some members of the Court
indicated a desire to decide the constitutionality of curfews. See Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall insisted that the
issue presented by Bykofsky, "whether the due process rights of juveniles are entitled to lesser
protection than those of adults," required the Court to grant certiorari since the case posed "a
substantial constitutional question-one which is of importance to thousands of towns with similar
ordinances .. . ." Id. at 965-66.
1 Compare Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa 1975),
aff'dper curiam, 535 F.2d. 1245 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (holding minors
have less constitutional protection than adults); People ex rel J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo.
1989) (denying fundamental status to minor's right of intracity travel under due process); City
of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 386 (Iowa 1989) (same); Metropolitan Dade County
v. Pred, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1995) (indicating that
juveniles do not possess same 'quantum or quality of rights as adults" under both state and
federal Constitutions) with Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (assuming without
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not have a fundamental right to movement results in an Equal Protection
analysis using the less stringent rational basis test." In Qutb, the Fifth
Circuit did not conduct an extensive inquiry into this issue but merely

adopted the position that the minors' right to movement is fundamental.'

deciding that minors' right to movement is fundamental); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d
1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that right to movement extended to minors for purposes of
overbreadth analysis); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (indicating that
right to walk streets is included in First Amendment rights and "liberty" under Fifth
Amendment's due process clause); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384-85
(D.N.H. 1984) (indicating that amended curfew violated minor plaintiffs' personal liberty in
freedom of movement); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D.N.H. 1981)
(holding right to movement invaluable and central to juveniles), rev'don othergrounds, 668 F.2d
617 (1st Cir. 1982); Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(assuming without deciding that minors possessed constitutional right to movement): City of
Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa 1992) ("Whenever the First Amendment
rights ... require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the
First Amendment."); Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 606 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (stating
that minors' right to movement "isnow widely regarded as fundamental"); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1987) (holding that overbroad
curfew restricted First Amendment right of movement); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.
2d 329, 336 (Wis. 1989) (holding juvenile curfew could infringe upon minor's fundamental right
to movement).
81See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1265. The Middletown curfew ordinance neither created
a suspect classification nor infringed upon a minor's fundamental right. Id. As a result, the
traditional rational basis test was "the proper yardstick to utilize in determining the constitutionality of the ordinance." Id.; see supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing rational basis
test).
The Middletonjuvenile curfew satisfied the test's requirement that the curfew have a rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest. The government interests that the court found
included (1) preventing minors from committing acts of violence against other minors as well as
adults; (2) enforcing parental control by having parents take legal responsibility for their children;
(3) protecting the public at large from thejuvenile's nocturnal mischief; and (4) reducing juvenile
crime activity in Middletown. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1255. The district court reasoned that
the maintenance of the town's interests in social and economic welfare outweighed the minor's
interest in nocturnal movement. Id. at 1258.
Additionally, the curfew was not arbitrary in terms of age classification. Id. at 1265. The
district court maintained that the age classification in the juvenile curfew rested upon real and
substantial differences among the adult and juvenile maturity levels. Id. Thus, the dissimilar
maturity levels permitted different treatment and led to the conclusion that the curfew did not
violate equal protection principles. Id. at 1265-66.
A court's determination that the right to movement is not a fundamental right also has an
adverse impact on the minors' substantive due process claim; the court will apply a rational basis
standard which is easily met. See People ex rel J.M., 768 P.2d at 223; Simmons, 445 N.W.2d
at 369.
Other courts have criticized Bykofsky for its application of the rational basis test. See, e.g.,
Waters, 711 F. Supp at 1136 (disagreeing with Bykofsky Court's holding that minors' constitutional rights deserve less protection than those of adults).
12 "For purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding that the right to move about
freely is a fundamental right." Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
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As a result, the court subjected the curfew ordinance to the strict scrutiny

test.83
In a non-emergency situation, states cannot show a compelling state
interest to justify a curfew against adults.' 4 When confronted with a
constitutional challenge to a curfew law by a minor, courts look to Belotti
v. Baird.' In Belotti, a plurality of four Supreme Court Justices offered
the following reasons to justify treating minors and adults differently: (1)

the peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed manner; and (3) the importance of the parental

role in child rearing.86 The substantive "test" created from these criteria
has been criticized by legal commentators8 and inconsistently applied by
SId.
"While both general curfews and juvenile curfews enacted during emergency situations by
municipalities have been upheld in federal and state decisions, in those situations where emergencies have not existed the courts have struggled with the constitutional issues raised by the curfews
and frequently held such ordinances to be unconstitutional." Cahill, supra note 16, at 521-22.
81443 U.S. 622 (1979). Belotti addressed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that
restricted a minor's right to have an abortion without parental consent. Id. at 625-26 (citing
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (Vest Supp. 1979)). The statute provided:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of
both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother's parents
refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a Judge of the superior court
for good cause shown.
Id. This statute, which required a minor to obtain either both parents' permission or judicial
permission to have an abortion, was unconstitutional because it unduly infringed upon the minor's
right to seek the procedure. Id. at 647-48.
One commentator claims that since Belotti "all lower courts deciding the constitutionality
of juvenile curfews have adopted and applied" its principles. Horowitz, supra note 65, at 383.
1 Belotti, 443 U.S. at 634. Justice Powell justified these three reasons on the grounds of the
unique status of children under the law. Id. at 633. "'Children have a very special place in life
which law should reflect.'" Id. (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
87 See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 65, at 383 (insisting that lower courts should not blindly
follow Bellotti). Horowitz insists that "Bellotti. . . should not be regarded as ajudicial talisman."
See id. at 406. She further insists that it is inappropriate to apply the rationale of an abortion case
to evaluate a state's interest in a juvenile curfew. Id. at 408. "Abortion has a unique and special
standing within the context of fundamental rights that 'require a State to act with particular
sensitivity.'" Id. at 409 (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642). The three factors presented by the
Bellotti plurality represented a desire to address the sensitive nature of a minor's abortion rights,
but the Court failed to note whether these factors could be formulated into a test in non-abortion
cases. See id. at 407-08.
Another commentator advocates the use of a "compelling for children standard." See
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supra note 21, at 1172-73. Since courts have acknowledged that there are special interests surrounding children, a state's infringement upon the
juvenile's fundamental rights should be subject to its own special strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at
1172. Under this method of strict scrutiny analysis, a state may infringe on the minor's
fundamental rights when it demonstrates a compelling state interest "based on the unique development traits of children." Id. A court utilizing this standard would require juvenile curfew
24
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Nevertheless, the principles established in Belotti seem to

proponents to demonstrate that the juvenile curfew actually diminished the significant and real
danger of physical and emotional harm to minors and others. Id. The state proves this
"compelling for children" interest by demonstrating that the curfew exhibits one of the three
Bellotti factors. Id. at 1173. The "compelling for children" test was adopted by the dissent in City
of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Iowa 1989) (Lavorato, J., dissenting). Justice
Lavorato opined that the state would fail to pass a "compelling for children" test because none
of the Bellotti factors were present. Id. at 371-73. In support of this assertion, the dissent applied
the facts to the arguments and rationale offered in the Harvard Law Review article. Id. (citing
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supra note 21).
This standard, however, has not been accepted by the Iowa courts since Simmons. Writing
for the majority in City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992), Justice Lavorato
rejected a juvenile curfew and neither applied nor urged the use of the "compelling for children"
interest he had previously advocated in Simmons. In Russell, the Iowa Supreme Court held that
the city of Maquoketa's juvenile curfew ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 186.
In dicta, however, the unanimous court cited the majority's admission in Simmons that when a
juvenile curfew violated a fundamental right, the level of judicial scrutiny was raised from
rational relationship to strict scrutiny. Id. at 184 (citing Simmons. 445 N.W.2d at 367).
Susan Horowitz's proposed test differs from the "compelling for children" interest test. See
Horowitz, supra note 65, at 415-16. She insists that courts should not emphasize the Bellotti
factors when reviewing ajuvenile curfew. Id. Instead, courts should determine the validity of the
government's interest in the juvenile curfew on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. Id. Under
Horowitz's strict scrutiny analysis, the particular facts relating to the curfew, not the presence or
absence of a Bellotti factor, should be the determinative factors. Id.
In his note on curfews, Peter L. Scherr focuses on the substantive due process issue and
proposes an intermediate scrutiny test for courts. See Scherr. supra note 14, at 191. The curfew
must substantially relate to an important government interest unique to minors. Id. The state
would be required to prove that it has an important and unique interest in keeping the children
off streets and out of public places at night. Id. Similar to Horowitz's proposal, Scherr's test takes
into consideration the specific facts pertaining to each city's curfew. Id.
I The application of the Bellotti test has resulted in a number of inconsistencies. First, the
courts have wavered on the appropriate time to consider the three Bellotti factors. Some courts
have used Bellotti to determine the existence of the minors' fundamental right. See People ex rel
J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 233 (Colo. 1989) (holding presence of Bellotti factors justifies conclusion
that child's liberty interest in movement not coextensive with that of adults); accord City of
Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Iowa 1989). This approach. however, has been
sharply criticized. See id., 445 N.W.2d at 374 (Lavorato, J., dissenting). Justice Lavorato
indicated that "Bellotti presupposes that a fundamental right exists and simply uses the three
reasons to determine whether a governmental restriction can be placed on a fundamental right."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 484 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) (employing Bellotti analysis against Equal Protection claim after determining
existence of minors' fundamental right); Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supra note 21,
at 1172 (applying Bellotti analysis to create "compelling for children" interest because minors
possess fundamental right to movement).
Recent cases have employed a Bellotti analysis only after the court has determined that the
curfew violated the fundamental right. See In re Juvenile Action No. JT9065297. 887 P.2d 599,
606 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (examining Bellotti factors to determine presence of substantial state
interest to justify infringement on minors' fundamental right to movement); Pred v. Dade County,
No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 13-14 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994) (indicating three factor test
has "generally been considered by federal courts in determining when a state may give less deference to the constitutional rights of minors"), rev'd, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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furnish the necessary justification to infringe upon the rights of minors
where similar infringement upon adults would be unconstitutional. 9

App. Nov. 1, 1995).
Additionally, courts have differed on the number of Bellotti factors that
must exist to justify unequal treatment. One court required satisfaction ofall three Bellottifactors.
See McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd on othergrounds,
668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982) [hereinafter McCollester1]. In McCollester . the court determined
that the "peculiar vulnerability of children" and the minors' "inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner" were relevant to the implementation of the Keene juvenile
curfew ordinance. Id. at 1050-51. The court, however, struck down the curfew because the law
impermissibly usurped the parental role in child rearing. Id. at 1052. "[Tjhere are many situations
which are within the purview of the ordinance even though the parent did exercise reasonable
parental control or guidance." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Other courts, however, suggest
that different treatment can be justified if only one of the three factors is proven by the state. See
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting law on overbreadth
grounds but suggesting that one Bellotti factor would be sufficient to justify unequal treatment)
(citing Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 455 U.S. 283 (1982)); In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 606 ("If the state does not have a
significant interest that is unique to children in terms of one of these factors, then the state must
treat adults and children the same."); Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, supranote 21, at
1172-73.
Moreover, there has arisen a disagreement regarding the level of state interest that must be
satisfied using the Bellotti factors. A recent Arizona Court of Appeals decision contended that the
juvenile curfew can be upheld if the state demonstrates a "significant state interest." See In re
Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 606. Most courts, however, indicate that a state must use the Bellotti test
to demonstrate that a juvenile curfew furthers a compelling state interest. See Waters v. Barry,
711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1989); Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 13-14;
Allen, 524 A.2d at 478; City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988). It is
submitted that the compelling state interest standard is the proper level of scrutiny to evaluate the
juvenile curfew. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 65, at 383-84 (insisting that lower courts should
not blindly follow Bellott).
" See Simmons, 445 N.W.2d at 363. While the Iowa Supreme Court applied the "rational
basis" test to Panora's juvenile curfew, it insisted that the federal district court wrongly decided
Waters. Id. "We believe that the Federal District Court in Waters erred in its application of the
Bellottirationale." Id. at 369. The court stated that the epidemic dimension of drug usage among
minors reveals the "particular vulnerability" of children. Id. Since only one Bellotti factor must
be exhibited, it appears that the district court actually established compelling state interest for its
juvenile curfew. Id.; see also City of Milwaukee, 426 N.W.2d at 339 (concluding that states'
power to limit "parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare" justified
less deference to minors rights under Bellotti test).
But see Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 14-15. The Dade County Circuit Court
enjoined the juvenile curfew because it violated minors' rights under the Florida State
Constitution. Id. at 12, 14. The Dade County Commission drafted its ordinance with the explicit
requirement that the compelling state interest be satisfied by the Bellotti factors. See id. at 14.
The trial court, however, held that the state failed to prove the compelling state interest. Id. A
juvenile curfew would not curb increasing juvenile crime and victimization because most of the
crime occurred during daytime and was committed by a small group of repeat offenders. Id. at
15. This supports the contention that the trial court in Predrejected the argument that the curfew
was constitutional as a result of the Bellotti factors.
Butsee Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1136-37. The Waters court reviewed the Bellottifactorsand
held that none of them were present to allow less deference to the constitutional rights of the
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The Fifth Circuit in Qutb did not perform the Bellotti test, but rather
presumed that the rights involved were fundamental. 90 It is submitted,
however, that the court would have reached the same decision had Bellotti
been employed. The court addressed two of the Belotti factors-minors'
vulnerability and their inability to make informed decisionsg-in finding
that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting juveniles' welfare

minors. Id. The court rejected Bykofsky, which concluded that the constitutional interests of
minors were less compelling than adult and community interests. Id. at 1136 (citing Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1256 (M.D. Pa. 1975)). "Applying the Bellotti
factors, the Court thus holds that the context in which the District seeks to enforce the Act does
not justify differentiating between the constitutional rights of minors and adults." Waters, 711 F.
Supp. at 1137. First, the district court maintained that the scourge of drugs and violence posed
no peculiar danger to juveniles. Id. Second, "the inability to make critical decisions" did not
apply to a decision to remain in the house or roam the streets during curfew hours. Id. Finally.
the curfew "gracelessly arrogates unto itself and to the police the precious rights of parenthood"
and, thus, frustrated the thousands of parents who had control over their children. Id.
o Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 n.6.
9 In Qutb, the court could have merely referred to the parties' stipulation of the compelling
interest and moved on to determine whether the law was "narrowly tailored." See id. at 492-93.
The Fifth Circuit, however, articulated that the curfew represented an elevated interest in
protecting a juvenile because the state "has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its
young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair
their ability to exercise their rights wisely." Id. at 492 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417, 444 (1990)). It appears the court had "no difficulty agreeing" with the stipulation to the
presence of a compelling interest because the Hodgson reasoning satisfied the first two
components of the Bellotti analysis. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 482.
The trial court, holding that the curfew violated the minors' right to movement, argued that
the Dallas curfew would impair the child's ability to "take an innocent stroll or gaze at the stars
from a public park." Id. at 495 (internal quotations omitted). The Fifth Circuit correctly
dismissed this argument. Id. ("[A] juvenile may stare at the stars all night long from the front
sidewalk of his or her home .... "). Besides the obvious safety concerns of being in a dark,
public area in the early morning hours, there may be other significant consequences that will
affect the child the following day. For instance, a juvenile who goes for a late night "gaze at the
stars" on a weekday night might also fail to get enough sleep to be productive in school the
following morning. Further, there is no reason why a child should be "gazing at the stars" in a
public park or loitering on a street corner in the early morning hours when they have obligations
the next day. It is therefore suggested that a child involved in such activity demonstrates the "lack
ofjudgment" noted in Hodgson which should satisfy the "particular vulnerability" or the "critical
decision-making" components of the Bellotti test.
If the Dallas juvenile curfew ordinance did not provide the minor with the nine defenses,
the first two Bellotti criteria should not be satisfied. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d
1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981). In dicta, the Johnson court stated that overly broad curfew
restrictions did not present an issue of "peculiar vulnerability of children." Id. The court noted
that a minor was neither peculiarly vulnerable when he traveled or attended a religious or
scholastic activity during curfew hours nor when he was on the sidewalk abutting his house. Id.
Additionally, these activities would not satisfy the Bellotti concern of "critical decisions" on the
part of minors. Id. Therefore, a curfew lacking these exemptions should not satisfy the Bellotti
test. Labeling these activities as defenses, however, should eliminate the potential argument that
curfew restrictions do not satisfy the Bellotti test.
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because minors may lack the ability to exercise their rights properly.'

The third Bellotti factor examines the parents' role in their children's
upbringing.' Although the only two issues addressed by the trial court
were the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection issue and the First
Amendment free association challenge,' the Fifth Circuit considered the
previously unaddressed issue of whether the curfew violated the plaintiff
parents' fundamental right to rear their children as they see fit.95 The
Qutb court ruled that the juvenile curfew ordinance threatened only a
permissibly slight invasion of this right. 6 "Because of the broad exemptions included in the curfew ordinance, the parent retains the right to make

decisions regarding his or her child in all other areas."' It is suggested
that this conclusion, in effect, satisfies the third element of the Bellotti test.
The court properly concluded, therefore, (regardless of the plaintiffs'

92See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (reaffirming Supreme Court's recognition of states' particular
interest in youth).
9 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
9 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 490 n.2.
9 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1922) (determining that parents' rights
to rear their children fell within the ambits of the Fourteenth Amendment as a "liberty"); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) ("This primary role in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1942) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation by obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); see also Yoder v. Wisconsin. 406
U.S. 205, 232-33 (1971) (holding Wisconsin law requiring all children to attend school until age
16 violated Amish parents' fundamental right to rear children in accordance with Amish values
and religion).
11Qutb, II F.3d at 495-96. The U.S. Court of Appeals indicated that the juvenile curfew
only infringed upon parents' rights when the youth remained in a public place after the curfew
took effect. Id. This restriction represented only a minimal intrusion on the parents' rights. The
court argued that the parent could still dictate whether the juvenile remained in a public place or
establishment as long as the parent or guardian supervised the minor. Id. The parent still
controlled the minor's ability to attend all activities sponsored by the city, civic organization, or
any group that took responsibility for the minor. Id. Finally, the parent retained the right to
control the minors' ability to get a job, run an errand, seek out emergency aid, or exercise their
First Amendment rights. Id.
7 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495. It is submitted that the provision of these defenses to minors and
their parents in the Dallas juvenile curfew was not based upon an assumption that the traditional
family unit has broken down. Courts have rejected the contention that the state's desire to repair
the family unit is a compelling interest in the juvenile curfew. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of
Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that overbroad juvenile curfew inhibits rather
than promotes parents' rearing right); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp 1125, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989)
(same); McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.H. 1981) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982). But c.. In re Juvenile Action No. JT906527, 887 P.2d
599, 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (agreeing with assertion that Phoenix curfew "rests on the
implicit assumption that in many cases, the traditional family unit in which two parents exercise
control over their children's activities has dissolved").
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stipulation) that the Dallas juvenile curfew's infringement on minors' rights
was justified since it satisfied the Belotti test. In any event, because this

type of analysis is more stringent, and an ordinance that survives strict
scrutiny will necessarily pass a rational basis test, this Comment will focus
on the approach taken by the Qutb court as a model for approaching curfew
laws.
B.

Compelling State Interest

To survive a strict scrutiny examination, the juvenile curfew ordinance
must first promote a compelling state interest. 98 In Qutb, the city asserted
that the juvenile curfew furthered compelling state interests in that it would
simultaneously reduce youth crime and victimization, while promoting
juvenile safety and well-being. 99 The plaintiffs and the district court
agreed that this satisfied the first prong of strict scrutiny analysis."° As
a result, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Dallas City Council had a
compelling interest in its juvenile curfew and, therefore, was not required
to demonstrate that interest.l°1 In any event, statistics revealed the scope
of the juvenile crime problem in Dallas and demonstrated the nexus

I See supra note 72.
99Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
100Id. In fact, the parents conceded that the city had a compelling state interest to invoke a
juvenile curfew. Id.
101Id. The fact that the parties and the district court conceded that the Dallas juvenile curfew
served a compelling interest becomes a distinguishing factor for future courts reviewing a city's
juvenile curfew ordinance. See Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 14-15 (Fl.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994). In Pred, the Dade County Circuit Court concluded that the Dade
County juvenile curfew failed strict scrutiny because the county failed to show a compelling state
interest. Id. at 14. The Predcourt expressly distinguished its case from Qutb by pointing to the
parents' stipulation in Qutb. "[Tihe [p]laintiffs in Qutb stipulated that the Texas curfew served
a compelling state interest. There has been no such stipulation in this case. To the contrary, the
Defendant [sic] has been unable to prove that Dade's curfew serves a compelling state interest."
Id. Dade County failed to prove a compelling state interest under the Florida Constitution. Id. at
15. A Florida appellate court vacted the trial court's injunction on the ground that the curfew did
not interfere with a minor's rights under the Florida or United States Constitutions. Metropolitan
Dade County v. Pred, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1995).
Drawing such a legal conclusion deems it unnecessary to judge the curfew under any form of
equal protection analysis.
The concludsions drawn by the trial court in Pred, however, should not suggest that a
compelling state interest cannot be present if parties challenge ajuvenile curfew solely under the
federal constitution. Qutb paid scant attention to the compelling state interest issue because of the
stipulation. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492. It is submitted, however, that without the stipulation, the Fifth
Circuit would have held that the state's interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimization was
compelling.
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between the ordinance and the compelling state interest. °
C. Narrowly Tailoring the Curfew

Strict scrutiny also requires that the challenged statute be narrowly
tailored to serve the compelling state interest involved.'

3

In Qutb, the

court rejected the district court's conclusion that the Dallas curfew "totally
failed to establish that the Ordinance's classification between minors and
non-minors is narrowly tailored to achieve the stated goals of the
curfew." ' Rather, the curfew's nine defenses were deemed to comprise
the least restrictive methods for accomplishing the "compelling" municipal
goal of reducing juvenile crime and victimization. 5 Therefore, the

curfew was drawn narrowly enough to pass strict scrutiny."0 6

In Qutb, the defense provision of the juvenile curfew was "the most
important consideration in determining whether this ordinance [was]
narrowly tailored."107 An earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Johnson v. City
of Opelousas,0 8 established the proposition that a broad defense section
would serve as the method to narrowly tailor the ordinance. ,09 In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit reversed a Louisiana federal district court's holding
that the Opelousas juvenile curfew ordinance was constitutional."10 The

"'2 Qutb, I1F.3d at 493. The court did not require the city to provide the exact data on the
number of juveniles who commit crimes during the curfew hours or figures pertaining to their
juvenile victims to show the nexus. Id. at 493 n.7. But see Williams, supra note 48, at 482
(contending that city should provide exact statistical evidence of high rates ofjuvenile crime and
delinquency to prove constitutionality of juvenile curfew).
103See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493. The juvenile curfew will satisfy this portion of strict scrutiny
if there is a "nexus between the stated government interest and the classification created by the
ordinance."Id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). Moreover, the city must demonstrate that the curfew ordinance utilized the least restrictive means to
accomplish a reduction in juvenile crime and victimization. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493.
104Id.
,1Id.; see supra note 49 (listing Dallas curfew's defenses).
,06
Qutb, IIF.3d at 495. This decision was the first instance of a federal court concluding
that ajuvenile curfew ordinance passed a strict scrutiny test. Cf. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (holding curfew satisfied rational basis test), aff'd,
535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). But see Waters v. Barry, 711 F.
Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding curfew failed to pass strict scrutiny).
101Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493-94.
1- 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
10 Id. at 1074 ("Since the absence of exceptions in the curfew ordinance precludes a
narrowing construction, we are compelled to rule that the ordinance is constitutionally overbroad.").
110See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 488 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d
1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
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court of appeals concluded that the law was constitutionally overbroad," 't
but limited its decision to this sole issue."12 The court maintained that the

curfew must provide an exemption for minors exercising their First
Amendment rights during curfew hours." 3 The Dallas curfew satisfied
this requirement and also provided other defenses described in Johnson." 4 Additionally, the Qutb holding addressed other issues left unanswered in the earlier case." 5 Therefore, Qutb's holding that the Dallas

.. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1074. The Fifth Circuit held that the city's curfew ordinance
prohibited many activities that are protected by the United States Constitution. Id. The curfew
provided that the minor could be on a public street or public place during curfew hours only if
he or she was accompanied by a parent, tutor, or reasonable adult or if the minor was on an
emergency errand. See id. at 1071 (citing OPELOUSAS, LA., CITY CODE § 18-8.1(a) (1980)).
112 "We express no opinion on validity of curfew ordinances narrowly drawn to accomplish
proper social objectives." Id. at 1072. The court refused to apply the Bellotti test to determine
the presence of a compelling state interest to the curfew. "We need not conduct such an inquiry
. . . since none of the three factors, while possibly relevant to a general curfew mandate, apply
to the overly broad restrictions with which we are concerned." Id. at 1073 (footnote omitted).
13 The court's criticism against the curfew's "implicit prohibitions" established certain
prerequisites for future juvenile curfew ordinances. To satisfy this standard, the Fifth Circuit
implied that a juvenile curfew ordinance must provide for certain instances which the Opelousas
curfew failed to consider.
[U]nder this curfew ordinance minors are prohibited from attending associational
activities such as religious or school meetings, organized dances, and theater and
sporting events, when reasonable and direct travel to or from these activities has to be
made during the curfew period. The same inhibition prohibits parents from urging and
consenting to such protected associational activity by their minor children. The curfew
ordinance also prohibits a minor during the curfew period from, for example, being
on the sidewalk in front of his house, engaging in legitimate employment, or traveling
through Opelousas even on an interstate trip. These implicit prohibitions of the curfew
ordinance overtly and manifestly infringe upon constitutional rights of minors in
Opelousas.
Id. at 1072.
"4 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494-95. The Dallas curfew satisfied strict scrutiny because "the city
has enacted a narrowly drawn ordinance that allows the city to meet its stated goals while
respecting the rights of the affected minors." Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). The curfew
incorporated as defenses those curfew-prohibited activities that Johnson indicated were substantial
infringements upon the juveniles' constitutional rights. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072. It should
be assumed that the drafters of the Dallas juvenile curfew relied upon Johnson v. City of
Opelousas as a guide because most of the defenses provided in the Dallas curfew are cited by
Johnson as necessary to a narrow construction. Compare Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072 with supra
note 49 (listing nine defenses in Dallas curfew).
"' In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit indicated that a narrowly drawn juvenile curfew would be
constitutional if the state demonstrated that the curfew's restrictions served a "significant state
interest . . . that is not present in the case of an adult." Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1073 (citations
omitted). The city failed to establish this particular type of interest when it imposed its curfew.
Id. Qutb, however, indicated that a compelling state interest is required. Moreover, the Bellotti
test should be used as "[t]his analysis affects the balancing between the state's interest against the
interests of the minor when determining whetherthe state's interest is compelling." Qutb, 11 F.3d
at 492 n.6 (emphasis added).
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juvenile curfew did not violate the Equal Protection Clause represents the
Fifth Circuit's affirmative opinion on the validity of narrowly drawn

curfew ordinances, and is not inconsistent with earlier decisions.
It is suggested that federal courts may not simply rely on the number

of defenses to determine whether a curfew is narrowly tailored. In Wters,
the district court concluded that Washington's curfew was not narrowly
tailored because of a lack of a logical nexus between the state interest and
the classification created by the ordinance; 11 6 the court seemed to ground
its logic in certain incomplete and inaccurate crime statistics.1 7 In Qutb,

116According to the court, "[Ijogic and the unrebutted evidence in the record . . . indicate
that in this instance no such [narrowly tailored] relationship exists." Waters, 711 F. Supp. at
1139. With respect to this issue the court bluntly stated, "'in practical effect, the challenged
classification simply does not operate so as rationally to further the Act's express objectives.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973)).
7 Even though the statistics painted the picture of a besieged and troubled city, Waters
contended that the particular crime data did not establish a relationship between the challenged
classification and the need to stop the problem of juvenile crime. Id. Statistics offered in the
record revealed that none of the 26 juvenile homicide victims in 1989 were murdered during the
hours covered under the proposed D.C. curfew. Id. Only half of these homicides occurred outside
the victim's home. Id. Moreover, between 1985 and 1988, approximately half of the homicides
in the District occurred during non-curfew hours. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139. Reliance on
these figures weighed heavily in the district court's decision to reject the contention that the
curfew was narrowly drawn. Id.
Further, Waters described the city council as "naive" for assuming that a curfew discouraged
juveniles from leaving their homes at night to engage in criminal behavior. See id. ("The naivete
of such an assumption is striking.") It appears that the "logic and unrebutted evidence in the
record" offered by the Waters Court reveals its own naivety. The court's insinuation that the "far
more painful" punishment given to juveniles who break the law served as a better method of
preventing crime indicates that the court failed to understand why the city implemented the curfew
in the first place. A juvenile curfew probably can not deter the juvenile from leaving his house
during curfew hours but it enables a police officer who sees a potential violator to stop, question
and possibly detain that juvenile before the minor can cause harm or have any harm befall upon
him or her. While a curfew may have the unfortunate effect of keeping an innocent child inside
the house during curfew hours, it also has important, beneficial consequences. The curfew can
potentially prevent the commission of a violent crime by the juvenile during those hours. More
importantly, the curfew serves to protect innocent minors from falling prey to all criminals during
those hours. See In re Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599, 610 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1994)
(insisting Phoenix curfew protects law-abiding minors by removing "them from the physical
proximity and spheres of influence of those juveniles who may have already chosen a life of
crime and will ignore any curfew"). More significantly, the district court based its logic on data
that was incomplete for purposes of this analysis. The court cited only three statistics, all relating
to murder. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139. While this crime certainly poses a serious problem,
it is the rarest of violent crimes committed by the juvenile. See supra note 2. When citing these
murder statistics, the court discussed the number ofjuveniles killed in the district and ignored the
number of juveniles who actually committed murder. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139.
Moreover, the Waters Court agreed that Washington, D.C. was in the midst of a crisis that
resulted from an "unprecedented explosion of violence" relating to the surge in illegal narcotic
activity. Id. at 1127.
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however, the Dallas City Council provided the court with the appropriate
connection between the
data to enable the city to establish the logical
8
ordinance and the applicable state interest." t

It appears, however, that the court did not base its logic on the numbers ofjuveniles arrested
in Washington, D.C. for rape, robbery, aggravated assault, or any drug related violent crimes.
The court failed to consider the number of juveniles that commit these serious, violent crimes.
The FBI and Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
consider the juvenile's participation in these crimes to be just as serious as their involvement in
murders because these crimes comprise the Violent Crime Index and are monitored closely by
the two government agencies. See supra note 2. Any court could conclude that a juvenile curfew
fails to bear an intimate relation to the problem of juvenile crime when the only statistics
depended upon by the court relate to a small fraction of the problem. It seems, therefore, that the
district court performed an incomplete analysis on the nexus between the curfew ordinance and
the state's potential compelling interest.
"8 The city provided certain statistics to demonstrate that there was a nexus between its
compelling state interest and the juvenile curfew ordinance. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493. These
statistics illustrated
1. Juvenile crime increases proportionally with age between ten years old and sixteen
years old.
2. In 1989, Dallas recorded 5160 juvenile arrests, while in 1990 there were 5425
juvenile arrests. In 1990 there were forty murders, ninety-one sex offenses, 233
robberies, and 230 aggravated assaults committed by juveniles. From January through
April 1991, juveniles were arrested for twenty-one murders, thirty sex offenses, 128
robberies, 107 aggravated assaults, and 1042 crimes against property.
3. Murders are most likely to occur between 10:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. and [are] most
likely to occur in apartments and apartment parking lots and streets and highways.
4. Aggravated assaults are most likely to occur between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m.
5. Rapes are most likely to occur between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., and sixteen
percent of rapes occur on public streets and highways.
6. Thirty-one percent of robberies occur on streets and highways.
Id. Based on this data, it was evident that the problems of juvenile crime and victimization were
worsening. Furthermore, the data indicates that a high degree of juvenile crime occurred during
the hours affected by the curfew. Thus, there was an intimate relationship between the classification created by the juvenile curfew and the problem facing the city.
It is important to note, however, that the Fifth Circuit drew its conclusion without requiring
the city to provide "detailed studies of the precise severity, nature and characteristics of the
juvenile crime problem." Id. at 493 n.7. It has been argued that a city should document specific
statistics ofjuvenile crime and delinquency in the ordinance's statement of purpose. See Williams,
supra note 48, at 482 (providing cities with "practical suggestions" on drafting valid juvenile
curfew ordinances). Qutb indicates that the failure to include this data will not invalidate the
curfew.
The Qutb Court also dismissed the necessity of offering proof regarding the effectiveness
of a juvenile curfew in solving the juvenile crime problem. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493 n.7 (indicating
that "we do not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of legislation") (citations
omitted). It would have been nearly impossible for the city to satisfy this requirement because
the city suspended implementation of the curfew until the court challenges had been exhausted.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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III. STATE REACTION TO THE QuTB DECISION
Supporters of juvenile curfews hope the Fifth Circuit's holding and the
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari will end the controversy
surrounding juvenile curfews. n 9 Since Qutb, a number of cities have

enacted curfew ordinances with the confidence that their laws will survive
court challenges." t One state has enacted legislation specifically authoriz-

ing local governments to impose juvenile curfews within their city
limits. 2 ' This legislation itself, however, is likely to face legal challeng-

es."

Since Qutb, the courts of two states have attempted to resolve the

issue of whether to strike down a juvenile curfew on federal and/or state

"I See, e.g., Silence is Golden; Enough Said On Curfew Gripes, ARiz. REPUBLIC, June 4,
1994, at B8 (insisting that Supreme Court ruling should help uphold Phoenix curfew undergoing
judicial challenge); A Casefor Curfews, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 4, 1994, at 18
(stating curfews will protect children and other members of society). But see Indira A. R.
Lakshmanan, High Court Declines to Consider Curfew; Decision on Dallas Case may Affect
Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1994, at 21 (reporting that Laurence Tribe believes Supreme
Court inaction has no impact on issue as it "means absolutely nothing about whether the court
would uphold a curfew of this kind").
,1See supra note 13; Rohter, supra note 13 (reporting Dade County City Council approval
of juvenile curfew inspired by Qutb decision). James Burke, the sponsor of the Dade County
curfew, insisted that he had been motivated to seek the curfew by the Dallas juvenile curfew
ordinance and not by a personal violent crime committed against him by a young adult. Id.; see
also Michael Browning, Curfew is Success in Big Easy, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 1994, at A14
(reporting New Orleans enacted juvenile curfew on June 1, 1994); Dale Anderson & Harold
McNeil, Griffin Signs Law on Curfew; Curb on Young to Begin Jan. 1, BUFF. NEws, Dec. 6,
1993, at 1 (reporting that Buffalo, N.Y., mayor signed juvenile curfew law). See generally
Lakshmanan, supra note 119, at 21 (quoting Laurence Tribe as saying Qutb result was likely to
"give the excuse to go ahead" and institute juvenile curfews); Todd Murphy, BatherAgainto Try
for Youth Curfew with New Provisions, COURIER-J., June 2, 1994, at 1B (reporting attempt by
Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky to institute curfew following Qutb decision).
121See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 877.20-.25 (West 1994). Specifically, the legislation provides
"counties and municipalities the option of adopting" a local juvenile curfew ordinance. Id.
§ 877.20; see also supra note 13. Contained among its provisions is a defenses section that is
very similar to the Dallas juvenile curfew ordinance. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.24.
Surprisingly, the Texas State Senate rejected a similar bill that would provide its counties
with the power to impose juvenile curfews. Mark Langford, Texas Senate Rejects Juvenile
Curfew, U.P.I., Feb. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file.
1" See supranote 113. Despite the presence of exceptions similar to those found in the Dallas
curfew, the legislation is nonetheless vulnerable to attack. In fact, a Dade County, Florida curfew
was struck down as unconstitutional shortly after the Florida legislature enacted § 877.20. See
Pred v. Dade County No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994), rev'd, 1995 Fla. App.
LEXIS 11440 (Fla. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1995); see also Luisa Yanez, Judge: Dade Curfew Violates
Teen's Rights, SUN-SENT., Sept. 22, 1994, at lB. This ruling, however, was not based on the
Federal law. FloridaBacks Local Curfew for the Young, supra note 13, at 26. As a result, Dade
County is strongly considering adoption of a new juvenile curfew, pursuant to the Florida statute,
but with concerns about a possible challenge. Id.
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constitutional grounds."2 It is submitted, however, that the importance
of Qutb has not been diminished by the legal conclusions made by these
courts.
A.

In Re Juvenile

In In Re Juvenile, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that Phoenix's
juvenile curfew did not violate the constitutional rights of minors 24 and
was not impermissibly overbroad." z The court cited Qutb to support its
decision, 26 but this reliance is arguably inappropriate.
It is submitted that the Arizona court erred because the juvenile curfew

ordinance was substantially overbroad and, thus, did not satisfy the
"narrowly tailored" component of strict scrutiny analysis. 2 7 The Phoenix
curfew contained fewer exceptions than some curfews overturned by other
courts.128 Most notably, the curfew lacked an exception for minors

" See, e.g., In Re Juvenile Action No. JT906527, 887 P.2d 599, 611-12 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994) (finding Phoenix curfew constitutional); Pred,No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 18 (holding
Dade County juvenile curfew unconstitutional), rev'd, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Fla. Ct.
App. Nov. 1, 1995); see also Sansbury v. City of Orlando, 654 So. 2d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (denying preliminary injunction against implementation of Orlando's juvenile curfew).
14 See In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 612 (holding that curfew does not violate state and federal
constitutional guarantees). In this case, a minor violated the Phoenix juvenile curfew ordinance
by remaining in a public park after curfew hours. Id. at 602. The juvenile court found the minor
guilty of violating the curfew and punished her with a small fine. Id. The minor appealed,
contending the curfew violated her state and federal constitutional rights. Id.
The Arizona court observed that the juvenile curfew burdened the minor's fundamental right
to movement and her First Amendment rights. Id. at 607. The court, however, contended that
this burden was justified if the state demonstrated a "significant state interest ... not present in
the case of an adult." In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 606 (citations omitted). The court reviewed the
Bellotti factors and determined that each factor could prove the presence of the significant state
interest. Id. at 606-07. The court, however, asserted that the state had also demonstrated a
compelling interest to impose a juvenile curfew. Id. at 608. Since the interest was compelling.
the Arizona court concluded that the curfew survived a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 609.
12 Id. at 608-10. The Phoenix curfew expressly provided the minor with only three defenses:
when the minor is on an emergency errand, when the minor is with a parent, guardian, or an
adult responsible for the child, or when the minor is on a reasonable, legitimate and specific
business errand or activity for a responsible adult. Id. at 609 (citing PHOENIX, AZ., CITY CODE

§ 22-1 (Supp. June 30, 1993)). The court, however, insisted that these three exemptions were
more liberal and generous to a minor's constitutional rights and did not make the curfew
unconstitutionally overbroad. In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 609.
1 "The fact that the Phoenix language is not identical to the Dallas ordinance does not mean
that the reasoning in Qutb cannot be applied to analyze the Phoenix ordinance." Id. at 609.
11 According to the Arizona Court of Appeals, a courts' analysis of the overbreadth issue
mirrors the narrowly tailored question because, "[l]ike the strict scrutiny test, the overbreadth
doctrine also requires that the ordinance be narrowly tailored." Id. at 608 (citing State v.
Johnson, 542 P.2d 808 (Ariz. 1975)).
' See supra note 126.
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exercising their First Amendment rights during curfew hours, which, in
itself, should render this curfew unconstitutionally overbroad.12 9 The
Arizona court, however, overlooked this fatal flaw by liberally construing

the three enumerated defenses to imply a defense for minors exercising
their First Amendment rights. 3° This conclusion, however, was not
supported by any case law.' Qutb and other federal court decisions on
juvenile curfews seem to be clear on this issue -

the curfew ordinance

must explicitly contain a First Amendment exemption to ensure the curfew
will be constitutional.'

Therefore, the Phoenix juvenile curfew should

" See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1071 (1980) (holding that
ordinance is unconstitutional because it infringed upon rights such as freedom to travel to associational activities); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183-84 (Iowa 1992) (holding
that ordinance was overbroad because it stifled First Amendments Protections); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 483-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (holding that curfew
affected personal liberties). But see City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 339-40 (Wis.
1988) (determining that juvenile curfew will not be unconstitutionally overbroad for failure to
provide minor with First Amendment defense). The 5-4 decision to uphold this curfew, however,
has been viewed as unpersuasive and criticized as "gloss[ing] over the need to draw curfew
ordinances narrowly to avoid infringement of fundamental rights under the First Amendment."
Russell, 484 N.W.2d at 186.
1-1In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 609. The court viewed the Phoenix curfew defenses as "more
liberal or generous" than the ten defenses to the Dallas curfew. Id. The court, however,
recognized that previous courts had invalidated juvenile curfews because they failed to protect the
minor's fundamental rights. Id. (citations omitted); see also supra note 129. These rulings should
have convinced the Arizona court to overturn the curfew because the ordinance failed to provide
explicitly the defense for First Amendment activities. Rather than invalidate the present curfew
and require the city to rewrite the law, the Arizona Court of Appeals liberally construed the
curfew's defenses to contain this exception. See In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 609.
"I~Id. To support this contention, the Arizona court relied on the Qutb reasoning that "the
ordinance can be examined fairly only when the defenses are considered as part of the whole."
See id. (citing Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493). It appears, however, that the Qutb court articulated this
point of view to save a juvenile curfew that contained the broad defense section. The Fifth
Circuit compared the defenses in the Dallas curfew against the prohibitions of the Opelousas
curfew to demonstrate that the Dallas curfew was narrowly drawn and, therefore, constitutionally
sound. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494-95. when one considers the minors' defenses to the Phoenix
curfew, one cannot agree with the Arizona court's contention that the Phoenix curfew exemptions
are more generous than those found in the Dallas ordinance. See City ofMilwaukee, 426 N.W.2d
at 340 (recognizing the Bykofsky curfew as more liberal than Milwaukee ordinance because
former provided more listed defenses to minors). Assuming that a First Amendment defense is
implied in the Phoenix curfew, this ordinance does not exempt a minor on an errand at the
direction of his or her parent, allow the minor to attend a city or civic sponsored activity, permit
a minor to be in a motor vehicle travelling interstate, or enable the minor to remain on his own
sidewalk to gaze at the stars during curfew hours. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 498 (citing DALLAS CODE
ch. 31, § 31-33(c)(1)). Ajuvenile curfew ordinance lacking these exemptions, therefore, should
not be construed as more liberal than an ordinance that provides the minor with these defenses.
'3 See id. at 494 (holding that juvenile curfew survived strict scrutiny by respecting youths'
freedoms, "mlost notably, if the juvenile is exercising his or her First Amendment rights, the
curfew ordinance does not apply"); Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072 (prohibiting minors from
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be seen as unconstitutionally overbroad because it lacks these fundamentally
required defenses. It is not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest and the Arizona Supreme Court should reverse the decision and
invalidate the ordinance.
B.

Pred v. Dade County
In Pred, a Florida intermediate appellate court reversed a Florida trial

court's decision to enjoin the Dade County juvenile curfew ordinance.'33

Unlike the Qutb and Juvenile holdings, the Florida trial court determined
the validity of the curfew solely on state constitutional grounds.' " The
court held the juvenile curfew unconstitutional because it violated the

minor's fundamental right to privacy'35 by infringing upon the minor's

exercising First Amendment activities during curfew hours "overtly and manifestly infringe[s]
upon [their] constitutional rights"); Russell, 484 N.W.2d at 185-86 (holding ordinance failed to
provide exception for First Amendment rights); Allen, 524 A.2d at 483 (holding that ordinance
unconstitutionally overbroad because it contained sweeping restrictions on minors' First
Amendment freedoms).
"I No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994), rev'd, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1995). On January 18, 1994, the Dade County Commission passed
the juvenile curfew ordinance by a vote of 10 to 3. Nancy San Martin, Dade Teen Curfew Takes
Effect Feb. 17 Unless It's Challenged, ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 19, 1994, at Al. Eighty percent
of Dade county residents and 90 percent of the county's police officers favored the juvenile
curfew. Id. (citing Florida International University study). Butsee Pred,94-03203-CA-21, slip
op. at 6-7 (citing disapproval of juvenile curfews of two Dade County police chiefs).
'14 Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 17-18. The plaintiff specifically alleged that the
Dade County juvenile curfew violated a number of sections of the Florida State Constitution. Id.
at 1; see FLA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 23 (West 1994).
Florida's Constitution provides its citizens with greater rights and protection than the United
States Constitution. See Pred, 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 10 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So.
2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992)). Furthermore, Florida's Declaration of Rights contains "a broad
spectrum of enumerated.

. .

implied rights and liberties that.

. .

protect each individual within

our borders from the unjust encroachment of state authority ... from whatever official source
into his or her life." Id. at 10 (quoting Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 963). The PredCourt agreed with
the plaintiffs that the juvenile curfew violated the minor's rights provided under the Declaration
of Rights, such as the freedom of speech, association, assembly and the freedom to "simply
stroll[] aimlessly." Id. at 11.
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that the
juvenile curfew violated the minor's Equal Protection rights under the Texas Constitution. Qutb,
11 F.3d at 495 n.9 ("We find nothing. . . that warrants a different treatment of this issue under
the state constitution."). Likewise, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the
Phoenix juvenile curfew violated the Arizona Constitution. In re Juvenile, 887 P.2d at 611
(determining that provisions of Arizona Constitution did not warrant different conclusion).
135 Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 7. Florida is only one of four states to provide
its citizens with an explicit constitutional provision guaranteeing a person's right to privacy. Id.
at 11. The Florida Constitution provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otheirwise provided herein. This
section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings
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ability to be "let alone."136 Applying a strict scrutiny test, the court held

that the state neither demonstrated a compelling interest
38

37

nor proved that

the curfew law was narrowly tailored.
The trial court found
ordinance unconstitutional and enjoined Dade County from enforcing
juvenile curfew. 139 The appellate court, however, concluded that
curfew ordinance did not violate a juvenile's rights under the Florida

the
the
the
and

United States Constitutions.Y4
The legal rationale articluated in the Pred decisions should not have
a significant effect on the Qutb decision or its rationale, since they were

primarily based on the state constitution. 41 Qutb applied federal constitutional standards to its review of the Dallas juvenile curfew, 4 z a fact
explicitly pointed out by the Pred trial court.4 3 Pred serves, however, as

as provided by law." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (West 1994). The Florida Supreme Court broadly
interpreted this section to embrace more privacy interests than the United States Constitution,
including the right to be free from physical and psychological intrusion or coercion by the state
or society. See Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 11-12. (citing In re Browning, 568 So.
2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990)).
,1See id. at 12 ("Plaintiffs 'personal autonomy' is sufficiently affected by the provisions of
the curfew.") (citation omitted).
"I Id. at 14-15.
13 Id. at 15-16.
"I Id. at 17-18. The recently enacted state law enabling cities to enact curfews may be in
jeopardy due to this decision. See FloridaBacks Local Curfewsfor the Young, supra note 13, at
26. Additionally, other Florida cities employing a juvenile curfew ordinance are justifiably
worried that their curfews may be unconstitutional as a result of Pred. See Richard Danielson,
Curfew Ruling in Dade May Hurt Tampa, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at IB; Dan
Tracy, Judge Throws Out Dade's Curfew On Teens, ORLANDO SENT., Sept. 22, 1994, at C1.
Presently, Orlando's curfew faces a court challenge by the ACLU, which had previously lost a
motion to stay the law. Tracy, supra. Orlando city officials, however, believe their ordinance is
distinguishable from Dade County's curfew because the Orlando law is "narrowly tailored" to
a 12-block area of downtown Orlando. Id.
'4 Pred, 1995 Fla. App. 11440, at *3-4. The Florida Court of Appeals, Third District
maintained that "under both the Florida and United States Constitutions, children, due to their
special nature and vulnerabilities, do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of rights as adults."
Id. (citing Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979)). Based on this legal theory, the Dade County juvenile curfew would not violate any
alleged rights of minors. Id.; see Sansbury v. City of Orlando, 654 So. 2d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (denying permanent injunction against implementation of Orlando's curfew).
''Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 2 (holding that juvenile curfew violates Article I
of Florida Constitution); see supra note 135; see also Pred, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440, at *23 (agreeing with County that curfew ordinance does not violate minors' rights under Florida
Constitution, but also indicating curfew does not "impermissibly impinge on any such rights" of
minors under United States Constitution).
,42
See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495.
'"I See Pred, No. 94-03203-CA-21, slip op. at 14.
Judge Gerstein listed two significant
reasons why his decision to invalidate the juvenile curfew differed from the Fifth Circuit's
decision to uphold the Dallas ordinance in Qutb:
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a reminder to legislators to be aware of state constitutional law while
drafting a juvenile curfew law. The Qutb decision remains the most recent
standard for federal constitutional guidelines of a juvenile curfew law.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has demonstrated the constitutional propriety of the
Fifth Circuit's decision to uphold Dallas' juvenile curfew ordinance. Qutb
v. Strauss highlights a number of considerations a municipality should
consider when drafting a juvenile curfew. First, attention should focus on
the defenses to be provided; Qutb demonstrates the importance of a broad
defense section. The quantity and quality of the defenses will often dictate
the constitutionality of the ordinance. Second, Qutb reveals that juvenile
curfews can survive strict scrutiny. Even though the Fifth Circuit did not
expressly address the compelling state interest issue, the opinion implicitly
indicates that fundamental rights are at stake when minors' rights to
movement are restricted, requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling
interest in the curfew. Moreover, the Dallas curfew was narrowly drawn
to preserve the minors' fundamental rights.
Future state court decisions that may invalidate curfews should not
diminish the importance of Qutb, where these curfews were either drafted
more broadly than the Dallas ordinance or were evaluated under more
protective state laws. The juvenile curfew may be one of the more
controversial methods employed to face the growing juvenile crime and

First, Qutb was decided under the federal constitution. Our state's constitution has
extended even greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution and
'when our state constitution creates fundamental rights, those rights must be respected
even if no similar right is recognized by the federal court.' Secondly, the Plaintiffs
[sic] in Qutb stipulated that the Texas curfew served a compelling state interest. There
has been no such stipulation in this case. To the contrary, the Defendant [sic] has been
unable to prove that Dade's curfew serves a compelling state interest.
Id. (citations omitted). The appellate court's decision to reverse the trial court and uphold the
curfew ordinance also differs from the Qutb decision. In Qutb, the Fifth Circuit deemed the
minors' rights to be fundamental, thereby requiring the curfew to satisfy a strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492-95 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2134 (1994). The Pred appellate court appeared to ignore the issue of whether a minor's
rights are fundamental or not, which triggers either a strict scrutiny or rational basis test. See
supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. Rather, the appellate court concluded that the minors'
constitutional rights are not violated by a juvenile curfew ordinance at all, thereby deeming it
unnecessary to apply any type of equal protection analysis.
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victimization problem facing our nation; however, when drafted in light of
the Qutb rationale, such curfews should not be deemed violative of minors'
rights under the federal constitution.
Craig M. Johnson

